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PREFACE 
This work examines a neglected but important area of Nazi Germ.any 
in the final year of the war in Europe~ In the fall of 1944 the German 
Armed Forces faced a trying and decisive winter. The Western Allies 
were poised and ready to smash the German armies in the West into ob-
livion. In the East, the Russians were readying themselves for the final 
lunge to Berlin. On the surface, it appeared that Hitler had the needed 
human and material resources to prevent the Eastern and Western Fronts 
from collapsing completely. But this study penetrates the s~rface, and 
shows that the German Armed Forces were deficient in oil, an absolute 
necessity in waging mechanized war. 
In the 1930's and on into the war Hitler endeavored to give the 
Wehrmacht an independent oil supply. He almost succeeded, but even with 
his ability to plan for the future, he did not count on the tremendous 
force of air power that the Allies were able to bring to bear on the Ger-
man oil industry. The results of these well planned air raids on German 
refineries were of crucial importance in halting the Wehrmacht in the 
Ardennes Counteroffensive and later in br~nging the Third Reich to its 
knees. 
I am very much indebted to Dr. Douglas D. Hale, Jr., who originally 
suggested the topic for investigation, and who later gave many, many 
hours of guidance , help, and support in the research and writing of the 
work. In addition, Dr. Homer L. Knight offered his valuable comments 
and criticism, which greatly improved the study. And I must not forget 
iii 
· the library staff at Oklahoma State University who were most helpful in 
obtaining valuable source material. 
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CHAPI'ER I 
GERMANY IN THE FALL OF 1944 
On the morning of October 22, 1944, General Siegfried Westphal, 
Chief of Staff of OB West, and General Hans Krebs, Chief of Staff of 
Army Group B,1 reported in at Adolf Hitler's headquarters in Rastenburg, 
East Prussia. What they were told astounded them. Hitler directed both 
generals to make immediate preparations for a major winter offensive in 
the West. The Fuehrer explained the preliminary plans to the surprised 
Westphal and Krebs, and they were then handed a roster of participating 
troop units designated to arrive on the Western Front by the end of No-
vember. The list called for eighteen crack infantry divisions, twelve 
strong panzer divisions, and several supporting units, including 100 new 
jet planes. 2 All divisions would be fully equipped and brought up to 
full strength. For example, panzer divisions were to receive new King 
Tiger tanks which were now rolling off the assembly lines. Thousands of 
recently drafted men were to fill both new and old divisions. The 
Ardennes counteroffensive was to be no diversionary attack, but a major 
assault. 
1oB West is the abbreviated fonn of Oberbefehlshaber West, the head-
quarters of the Gennan High Command for the Western Front.--a7'-in-C. West 
indicates the Commander-in-Chief of OB West. Anny Group B, a subordinate 
command of OB West, was, after October, 1944, made up of three annies for 
the Ardennes counteroffensive. 
2Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes: Battle of the Bul'e (United States 
Anny !!l World.!:!!.!: g, European Theater of -erations (Washington, 1965), 
pp. 21-22. (Hereafter cited as Cole, The rdennes. 
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Why were Westphal and Krebs astounded? 'lbey no doubt believed, as 
did many high ranking German officers, that the war would be over in 
October, or, at the latest, November.3 But now the Ft1ehrer was planning 
a major winter offensive, one that approached the magnitude of the 1940 
Western Offensive, in the Ardennes area of Belgium and Luxembourg. 
Could this be possible? Even Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, C.-in-C. 
West, had abandoned hopes for victory after the Battle of Stalingrad. 
If we can believe his later testimony, von Rundstedt was convinced that 
Germany had lost the war 'When it became evident that the Western Allies 
were successful in their Normandy landings. In view of major defeats on 
all fronts, both von Rundstedt and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel had twice 
previously asked Hi~ler to withdraw the Wehrmacht to borders of the home-
land.4 
In the fall of 1944 the picture for Germany appeared to be black 
indeed. The views of Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel and Gener-
als Westphal and Krebs seemed to be justified. It looked as though 
Germany would soon be forced to accept unconditional surrendero For the 
Wehrmacht was now near or within the frontiers of the Reich. By October 
the Western Allies were facing the Germans at their own border. The 
Canadian First Army was on the Lo~rer Rhine River in Holland, and the 
British Second Army was poised and preparing to drive into the Ruhr --
3Testimony of Albert Speer, June 20 , 1946, U. s., War Department, 
Allied Control Authority for Germany, Trial of ~ Major War .Qri~~ 
Before~ International Militarv Tribunal (Nuremberg, 194S'T, XVI, p. 
Zj:g6. (Hereafter cited as ~-T · 
4Testi mony of Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, August 12, 1946, 
Ibid. ll XXI~ p. 30. See also Anne Armstrong , Unconditional Surz•en-
der; The Impact of the Casa· l anca Policz upon World War II (New Bruns= 
wick,N.J., 1%1T;° pi): 138=145, forthe names of other"top German gener-
als and field marshals who believed Germany was through after the 
Normandy invasion. 
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the industrial heart of Germanyo Farther south, the American First and 
Ninth Armies were studying maps of the terrain between the Ruhr and the 
Main River, and the hard driving American Third Army was in Lorraine, 
ready to smash into the Saar. The American Seventh Army was attacking 
in Alsace, and the French First Army was punishing the Germans on the 
Upper Rhine. The American Fifth Ar-my, the British Eighth Ar-my, and a 
Polish Corps were struggling up the Italian peninsula and had reached the 
Po River in the north. 
On the Eastern Front the situation appeared even more serious. By 
August, 1944, the Russians had driven all the way from Stalingrad and 
Leningrad to the Vistula River in Poland. Four Russian Army groups were 
readying themselves for the final drive to Berlin. By September other 
Russian armies were in Rumania and Bulgaria, and on October 20 they oc~ 
cupied Belgrade and were preparing to move into Hungary. 
In the air war Germany was being bombed around the clock by the 
Americans and the British. The Luftwaffe was reduced to a pitiful shadow 
of the powerf'ul arm it had been in 1940 and 1941. For all practical pur~ 
poses the Germany Navy was now ineffective. It was bottled up in the 
Baltic. Allied convoys were crossing the Atlantic with ease. The only 
possible threat to Allied shipping was a new German submarine which ap.. 
peared too late to affect seriously the outcome of the war. 
Thus, prospects appeared bleak for Germany by October, 1944. How-
ever, a closer examination of the situation at this point will show that 
Germ.any was not as prostrate as she appeared; that von Rundstedt and 
Rommel were mistaken in beJieving their country already defeated; and 
that the planned Ardennes offensive was not as hopeless as Westphal and 
Krebs considered ito Subsequent evidence shows that Germany was far from 
vanquished. As late as November 20 General Dwight D. Eisenhower realized 
4 
that Germany was still very dangerous. At that time he asked the Com-
bined Chiefs of Staff to modify the terms of unconditional surrender, de-
claring that German morale was still very high on the Western Front.5 
Hitler and his followers, including many high Wehrmacht officers, were 
still confident that they held a formidable fighting force at their 
command. 6 
This confidence was founded on far more than a Nazi myth. For one 
thing, Germany had over 250 divisions still very much in the war. As 
late as December 1, fifty-seven Allied divisions faced seventy German 
divisions extended along the heavily fortified Siegfried Line.7 Ten to 
fifteen of these German divisions were crack panzer units, while many of 
those lost to date in the retreat from Normandy were comparatively ex-
pendable defensive divisions. 8 On the Italian Front fourteen German di-
visions were holding the Allies to limited gains. In the East approxi-
mately 170 German divisions faced the Russians. 9 
To be sure, German division strength was somewhat less in 1944 than 
what it had been in 1939 and 1940. In the early war years each division 
contained 16,000 to 20,000 officers and men, whereas in the latter years 
5chester Wilmot, ~ Struggle £2.!: Enrope (New York, 1952), p. 570. 
6Louis L. Snyder, ~ War; ! Concise Histozx, .!212.-~ (New York, 
1960), P• 393. 
7r. H. Thomas, "The Battle of the Ardennes," Quu:,ent History, VIII 
(May, 1945), p. 404. By February, 1945, Eisenhower commanded eighty=five 
divisions on the Western Front. See Wilmot, The struggle for Ellrope, p. 664. - -- - -
8winston s. Churchill, ~ Second World ~ (Boston, 1953), VI, p. 
9; Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader, trans. by Constantine Fitzgibbon (New 
York, 1952), P• 412; Fritz Sternberg, "Why the Nazis Fight On,"~ 
Nation, CLX (January 27, 1945), p. 100. 
9snyder, ~ !l!!:; ! Concise Histonz., 1222,-~, pp. 391, 393; George 
F. Eliot, "The German Army Today: Numbers, Disposition, M:>rale," Foreign 
Affairs, XXII (July, 1944), p. 511; Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 412. 
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division strength was down to appr oximatel y 12,000 officers and men. The 
panzer division strength remained constant at about 15,000 officers and 
men. On the other hand, there were more armored divisions at the end of 
the war than there were at the beginning. New divisions were constantly 
being formed. Up until June, 1944, the Navy and Illftwaffe both con-
tained 1,500,000 men, but after this date thousands were transferred to 
the .Army.10 In September twenty-five new Volksgrenadier divisions were 
formed, destined for both the Ea.stern and Western Fronts. The draft age 
was lowered from seventeen and a half to sixteen, and 500,000 new men 
were inducted into the Army during August, September, and October. Even 
though many of them were quite young, most were healthy, and the years of 
their youth had been spent in absorbing Nazi doctrine. Cadres of battle-
hardened officers and non-commissioned officers were assigned to train 
them. Al.so, a new strategic reserve unit was formed and ready by early 
fall -- the Sixth SS Panzer Army, which was to strike hard in the Ardennes 
11 
counteroffensive. 
Morale was still higho In the autumn of 1944 the German soldier was 
12 
still wllling to fight on. He hated t he i dea of uncondit ional surren-
der, and this, coupled with the fear of t he Russians invading his home-
land, stiffened his resistancea When the enemy nears the homeland, 
soldiers always fight harder, and this was no less the case with the 
German soldier. Because of the merci less bombing attacks on German 
cities, the German soldier was keeping t he Allied ground troops in his 
lOEl.iot, "The German Army Today: Numbers, Disposition, Morale," pp. 
510, 513. 
ll Wilmot,~ Struggle f.2!. Fllro~, pp. 556~557, 560. 
12charles Gwynn, "The Final Struggle," ~ Fortnight:!;z, CLVII (April, 
1945), P• 268. 
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mind as a target of revenge. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels urged 
the German soldier into fighting harder, lest the Allies free the foreign 
slave workers who would wreak vengeful havoc across the face of Germany. 
Paradoxically enough, some strategic gains were being derived from 
defeat. Even though the German Army was almost in the same geographical 
situation where it had begun the war in 1939, this was in many ways a 
help and a consolation to the German commanders. They had much less to 
defend. The frontier at the West Wall, Northern Italy, the Balkans, and 
the Vistula River was much shorter than the former one at the Atlantic 
Wall, North Africa and the Eastern Front -- when it extended from Lenin-
grad to the Caucasus. This meant that more troops could occupy less 
ground, and could more effectively employ the military principle of mass. 
Supplies could be moved to the Siegfried Line or to the Vistula in a 
matter of days or even hours, whereas it often took weeks to get needed 
materiel to Kharkov in the Ukraine, to Tobruk in North Africa, or to 
Cherbourg in France. 
By October, 1944, all fronts of the European War had stabilized. In 
addition to an overwhelming number of divisions, willingness on the part 
of the German soldier to fight, and shortened supply lines, there were 
other reasons for a solid front and a slowdown in the Allied advances. 
The Russian armies on the Vistula had halted there in August, and they 
did not begin a new drive until January. During June and July alone, the 
Red armies had advanced almost 400 miles, outrunning their lines of 
supply. In Russia during 1941 and 1942 the Germans had converted the 
railroads to their own gauge, and in many places the lines had been de-
stroyed by the retreating Germans. Because of this, Russian trains could 
not reach the Vistula until their Army engineers repaired and converted 
them back to the wide Russian gauge. Ar1other factor that helped 
7 
stabilize the F.astern Front was added German reinforcements, including 
the Hermann Goering Panzer Division from Italy.13 On the western side of 
the Vistula the Germans had and were building strong defensive works to 
help contain the impending Russian offensive. 
It was almost the same situation in the West. Poised on the Sieg-
fried Line in October, the British and Americans were also feeling a lo-
gistical pinch, and this problem helped the German Army in stabilizing 
the Western Front.14 Since the Normandy breakout in July, the Western 
Allies had advanced over 500 miles in less than three months. This 
caused problems. Gasoline supply failed to keep up with General Patton 
and his Third Army. General Hodges and his First Army were short of am-
IIIllnition while attacking Aachen.15 These logistic problems were later 
remedied, but until then the Allies experienced critical shortages. 
The seventy German divisions on the Western Front were sufficient 
to hold off General Eisenhower's thinly spread fifty-seven divisions 
during the winter of 1944-1945. The SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied 
Expeditionary Force) Planning Staff's concept of attack, which posed a 
''broad front" of 600 miles, came unper IIIll.Ch criticism.16 General Mont-
gomery, overall commander of the British and Canadian armies, mainly 
advocated a "narrow spearhead" method of attack. But it is not the pur-
pose of this study to examine the arguments. Suffice it to say the 
German Army at a time when the fronts were stabilized was able to make 
l3'Wllmot, ~ Struggle ~ Europe, p. 437. 
14auenther fil.umentritt, "Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Own Story of 
the Battle of the fulge," Collier's, CXXXI (January 3, 1953), p. 17. 
15wtlmot, ~ Struggle !2.!: Europe, p. 541. 
16 Ibid., PP• 540-541. 
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it extremely costly for any invader who violated either front. 
Allied supply problems and German reinforcements were not the only 
reasons for the stabilized fronts. The Allies were paying a high price 
in lives. The German Army was holding its own against the Russians in 
Hungary and the Balkans,17 and had reduced the Allied advance in Italy 
to a snail's pace. When the Allies did try a bold stroke to break the 
German line in the West in September it turned out to be disastrous. 
In an attempt to outflank the formidable West Wall on the northern 
end, the British and the Americans devised and executed Operation Market-
Garden. The expedition turned into a nightmare for the two Allies and a 
victory for the German Army. On September 17, 1944, the American 82nd 
and lOlst Airborne Divisions were parachuted into Holland, at Eindhoven, 
whereupon they were successful in seizing communications centers and a 
key bridge across the Waal River. Bit when the British 1st Airborne Di-
vision jumped into Arnhem, on the Lower Rhine, and a few miles north of 
Eindhoven, they met disaster. The German 9th and 10th SS Divisions were 
in this vicinity, and two panzer divisions had just been moved up from 
Aachen, where only a few days before they had repulsed the American First 
Army. To attest to the deadliness left in the German Army, only 2,000 of 
the original 8,000 paratroopers were evacuated from the Arnhem pocket.18 
Operation Market-Garden was a failure, the German Army took new heart, 
and this victory greatly contributed to a stabilization of the Western 
Front. It wou.ld be seven months before the Allies marched into Arnhem 
l?charles V. P. von Luttichau, "The Gennan Counteroffensive in the 
Ardennes," Command Decisions, edo by Kent Roberts Greenfield (Washington, 
1960), P• 448. 
18Wllmot, The Struggle for Europe, p. 541; Snyder,~!!!!:; !£2!2-
~ History, 1939-1945, pp. JS°?-388. 
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again. 
Besides Arnhem, other defensive victories were won at Aachen and the 
vital port city or Antwerp. Not only did these victories rally the Ger-
man Army, but they had an important psychologica1 impact on the German 
people as well. To ill Germ.ans it looked as though HitJ.er and ·Goebbels 
were now correct -- that the Westem Allies could be stopped at the West 
Wall.19 German cities were being saturated with bombs, and casua1ties 
ran into the thousands daily. 'lhe people needed hope to continue, and 
victories like Arnhem greatly helpedo 'lhe Americans, and especiilly the 
British, believed that saturation bombing would break the mora1e of the 
German people and thereby shorten the war. It failed to do either. If 
anything,. it only steeled the German people·~ s will · to resist. 20 
Not only did victories help the German people endure the air terror, 
but other factors stiffened their will against the idea of giving up. 
The principle of unconditiona1 surrend~r, advocated by President Roose-
velt and agreed upon by the Allies at Casablanca in 1943, was hard not 
only for the German Army to accept, but the people were revolted by it 
too. Eisenhower came to the conviction that if the idea of unconditiona1 
surrender had never been advocated and accepted, the war in &lrope would 
have ended sixty to ninety days sooner.21 Just as new divisions, short-
ened supply lines, and stabilized fronts were a source of renewed power 
for the Germans, so was unconditiona1 surrender. 
19 Wilmot, .!h,! Struggle f.2!: &.trope, P• 548. 
20&.ns Rum:pf, ,Ih! Bombing .2!, Germany, trans. by Filward Fitzgibbon 
(New York, 1962), P• 233. 
21Filward To Folliard and Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Ike0 s View: FoDoRo 
Policy Prolonged the War 11 " ,!!o .§.. ~' LVIII (January 4, 1965), P• 12. 
See a1so Armstrong, Unconditiona1 Surrender, pp. 138-147. 
10 
Another fearful thought for both the German people and the Army was 
the 1-brgenthau Plan. United States Secretary of the Treasury Henry J. 
Morgenthau, Jr. had advanced the plan and both Roosevelt and Churchill 
endorsed it. Unfortunately, the content of the proposal was leaked to 
the American press in September, 1944, and the Ger.mans quickly became 
aware of it. According to Morgenthau, industry was to be dismantled and 
the country reduced to an agrarian economy.22 Goebbels seized upon the 
plan with delight and made propaganda hay of it. By the fall of 1944 
many civilians and Wehrmacht officers had be.en ready to open the gates to 
the British and Americans in order to hold the Soviets out, but Goebbels 
argued that the West and their Morgenthau Plan were no better than the 
Bolshevists. According to Goebbels, both were bent upon the complete de-
struction of Ger.many and its people.23 With the people believing this, 
the war was to continue. 
Many Germans were also deceived by false hopes that the Allied coa-
lition would soon break apart. Under the direction of Goebbels, German 
newspapers reported a growing disunity among the Allies. A breakup would 
supposedly occur any dayo24 Stories like these greatly discouraged de-
featism and made Germans want to fight on. 
Another factor which bolstered German resistance was the apparent 
invulnerability of the Fuehrero The plot to kill Hitler at Rastenburg 
had failed on July 20, 1944, and Hitler believed all the more firmly that 
Providence had chosen him to lead the Third Reich on to final victory. 
By employing the dreaded Gestapo, the Nazi Party now established absolute 
22Wllmot, ~ Struggle ~ Europe, P• 548. 
23Ibid., P• 549. 
24sternberg, "Why the Nazis Fight on," p. 101. 
ll 
control over the Wehrma.cht and the peopleo 25 Defeatism was ruthlessly 
suppressedo The officers i:n:volved in the July 20 plot were arrested and 
many were barbarically executedo Webrmacht resistance against HitJ.er was 
now a thing of the pasto The generals had to fight on. 
Goebbels told the peopl,e that if the civil government were to be 
overthrown or to breakdown, seven million foreign slave workers would re-
volt and seek revenge on the Germ.an people. If' the civil government col ... 
lapsed, chaos would result. With Germany under bombardment and the Al-
lied ground troops on the frontiers, the only hope for the nation was for 
all Germ.ans to place their hopes and support in the Fuehrer and the 
Partyo 26 '!he state alone was the only bulwark against chaos in Germanyo 
New manpower and a bolstering of the German people o s will to resist 
were not the only sources of a strong Germany in October, 19Q4.o The 
front-l ine soldier needed materiel and armaments, and the workers at 
home came through remarkably wello This industrial resilience can be 
partially explained by the fact that enormous German potential was tapped 
only late in the war. During the fall of 1941, when three German army 
groups were rolling into lw.ssia, HitJ.er believed that the Red Army would 
soon capitulate and that the war would then be over. Accordingly, Hitler 
ordered the Germ.an war industry to return to peacetime productiono 27 Not 
until after the disastrous German defeat at stalingrad in January9 1943, 
did Germany fully begin to mobilize her war economy.28 Hitler thought 
25von Luttiehau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," po 
Q48., 
26Wil.mot, :rh! struggle !.2!:, Europe, PPo 550-551. 
27Ho Ro Trevor-Roper, "Portrait of the Real Nazi Criminal,"~ I2.£k. 
Times Magazine, February 29~ 1948, P• 470 
28Ho Wo DeWeerd, "Why Germany Lost," .!m!, Nationp CLX (January 16~ 
1945) ~ P• 6720 
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that the war could be won on a shoestring, but he was badly mistaken. 
In February, 1942, Hitler had appointed Albert Speer to the post of 
Minister of Armament Production. Speer0 s influence and power rose sharp-
ly, even eclipsing that of Goering, Ribbentrop, and Goebbels. In 1942 
Speer removed all war contracts from the German Armed Forces High Com-
mand and eventually became the economic dictator of Germany. Hilter 
seldom overruled him. The Armament Production Ministry became known as 
the "Speer Ministry," and deservedly so .. Between February, 1942, when 
Speer assumed control and September, 1944, German war production trip-
led. 29 
Unfortunately, the aircraft industry felt Speer's firm hand only 
late in the war .. in the middle of 1940 aircraft production was halted 
and it did not again commence until the end of 1941.30 In February, 
1944, Speer edged out Goering as head of aircraft production. By this 
time the Allies had begun their big raids on the Germ.an aircra~ in-
dustry. Speer took immediate steps to disperse the fighter assembly-
plant centers, and within t:wo months fighter production was greater than 
before the Allied raids begano In 1942, annual fighter production was 
14,500, but by 1944 it had jumped to 38,000 per year, and September, 
1944, was the month of peak production .. 31 
Jet fighter production cannot be considered a factor in Germany's 
ability to wage war in the fall of 19440 As early as 1943 the ME-262, a 
29John K. Galbraith and George W. Ball, "Interrogation of Albert 
Speer,"~, XIX (December 17, 1945), PP• 57-58. 
30Albert Kesselring, "How Hitler Could Have Won," Q.o §.. ~, XXXIX 
(September 2, 1955), P• 620 
31Ibid.; Galbraith and Ball, "Interrogation of Albert Speer," p. 
58; Testimony of Albert Speer, June 20, 1946, .!!'fr£, XVI, p. 484. 
l'.3 
Messerschmitt jet, could have been ready and fighting, but the Germans at 
that time took no definite steps toward the production or it., Had they 
done so, no doubt it could have swept many an Allied plane from the sky. 
Not until the end of 1944 did Willy Messerschmitt begin producing jets, 
but by then it was too late, and only a few were produoea.32 According 
to Albert Speer, large scale production of jet planes did not begin un-
til February and March, 1945.33 
But as a morale factor the possibility of jet planes was definitely 
a boost to the hopes of the Germans. By October, 1944, other new weapons 
were either available, in production, or on the drawing boards. Probably 
the most famous were the v ... 1 and v ... 2 rockets, or the so-called "wonder 
weapons .. " Goebbels told the Wehrmacht and the people that these rockets 
would save Germany and insure victory.. In 1942 Germany began testing the 
V-1, a pilotless, 350 miles per hour, jet propelled plane, but it was not 
used until June l'.3, 1944, when the first one struck L:>ndon .. Almost 2,300 
landed on London during the following eight days, at a cost of 5,479 
lives. In August the V-2 was u:nleashede This larger weapon flew at a 
speed of 3,000 miles per hour, at a height of sixty to seventy miles, and 
unlike the V-1, the v~2 could not be intercepted by Royal Air Force 
. . 
fighters .. Because of the V-2, 8,000 Britons lost their lives. In late 
August the Allies captured most of the launching ramps, but later, during 
the winter, some remaining V-l's and V=2is were launched from German.yo 
The targets were Antwerp and Liege, but little damage was sustained.. As 
with jet :fighters, it was once a.gain a. ease of not enough and starting 
too late.34 While the "wonder weapons" may have en~ouraged Germans to 
32Kesselring, "How Hitler Could Have Won," Po 62. 
3'.3restimony or Albert Speer, June 20, 1946, ~, XVI, p .. 484. 
34snyder, lb!.!'{£; ! Concise Histo:cy, 1.2:l2, ... ~, PP• 375 ... 376. 
14 
struggle on, they themselves had no significant effect on the overall 
military si tuationo 
If the German Army received no real help from jets or rockets, it 
did not, however, lack the necessary armament to wage war. The armament 
industries were bombed severely, but into the autumn of 1944, and under 
Speer's leadership, arms were still produced at a rapid rate. In testi-
fying at the Nuremberg Trials, .Albert Speer claimed that in 1944 he 
could completely re-equip forty armored and 130 infantry divisionso 
This was enough equipment said Speer9 for 2,000,000 men. According to 
Speer, .Allied bombing cost the armament industry only thirty per cent of 
its production.35 Thirty per eent is not a terrifically large figure, 
and we can see from this that while the bombings on the armament in-
dustry were somewhat costly, they did not spell the difference between 
defeat and victoryo 
Aerial bombardment had an even less impact on German panzer pro-
duction. During 1942 Ger.many was producing 9,300 tanks per year,36 but 
by August, 1944, the month that the air raids on panzer plants began, 
production was up to 19,400 per yea:r. Even into January, 1945, bombs or 
no bombs, the rate for that month was 22,250 per yearo37 Since Germany 
was on the defensive by the fa11 of 1944, self=propelled assault guns 
were just as important as panzerso Assault=gun assembly plants were lo~ 
cated in Czechoslovakia, and to a great extent were immune from bombing. 
Ihring August, 1944, 776 of these weapons were manufactured, and in 
35Testimony of Albert Speer!! June 20, 1946, ~' XVI, po 484 .. 
36Kesselring, "How Hitler Could Have Won," p .. 62. 
37Rum.pf, ~ Bombing ,2!. Germa:rrz;, p .. 145. Field lVJarshal Kesselring 
claimed, however, that panzer production was 27,000 in 1944 .. 
1.5 
November, 1944, the figure had jumped to 1,199.38 
Tanks and other vehicles of war required ball-bearings, and much 
Allied effort was devoted to the destruction of ball-bearing plants. De-
spite the myths which have grown up around the American raids on the 
Schweinfurt ball-bearing plants in October, 1943, they did not have a 
crippling effect on the German war effort. The plant buildings were de-
stroyed, but most of the heavy machinery remained intact. The raids only 
prodded the Germans into dispersing the industry, and by the fall of 1944, 
and due to Speer0 s efforts, ball-bearing production was back to pre-raid 
(October, 1943) levels.39 
Not only were German armored divisions supplied with large numbers 
of superior panzers, including the heavy Panthers and Tigers, but the in-
fantrym.en, too, were not lacking in arms and amnru.nition. The peak German 
arms output was not reached until 1944.40 Even into the fall of 1944, 
when air raids were heavy, production of the more important arms remained 
a.lmost the same as in the summer, and in some cases increased. In De-
cember, 1941, Germany manufactured 3,424 machine-guns; by July, 1944, the 
figure was 24,141; and in October of that year, German industry produced 
26,2.52 machine-guns-= all to Speer's credito German industry produced 
only 103 artillery pieces in December, 1941, but by Ju.ly, 1944, the 
figure was up to 1,154, and in October of that year the figure dropped 
but slightly.;..- to 1,049041 
38wilmot, ~ ~t:ruggle .f.2!: Europe, po 556~ 
39"Unified Industry a Military Peril," Railway Age, CXIX (November 
3, 194.5), P• ?19. 
40Kesselring, "How Hitler Could Have Won," p .. 62. 
41u. s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Economic ~-
port, pp • .5, 187, cited by Wilmot,~ Struggle f.2!. Europe, pp .. ·150, 1550 
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Clearly, the German Army had plenty of smal.1 .. arms and artillery, and 
they also had the necessary ammunitiono Speer testified that the peak 
production on munitions was not reached until August, 1944042 Three 
hundred and ten thousand tons of ammunition were manufactured during that 
month, and by October the figure was only slightly lower, 308,000 tons. 
During 1942 when the Wehrmacht was fighting deep inside Russia, ammuni-
tion production only averaged 105,000 tons per month.43 Thus, the German 
Army lacked neither arms nor ammunition in the fall of 1944 and on into 
the immediate winter when they were most urgently needed. 
The Ruhr, the biggest industrial area in Germany, was still pro-
ducing in the early autumn of 1944, though there was a sharp reduction in 
coal and crude steel as the year ended. The region still turned out 
needed castings and forgings well into 194.5, and production was not 
actually halted until the British and Americans conquered the area in 
M.aroh, 1945. Most of the light industries in the big cities of the Ruhr 
-- tank parts, small-arms, communication equipment, munitions -- had been 
moved to smaller towns in the Ruhr or to Central or Eastern Germ.any. A.1-
so, the besieged country resorted to prefabrica~ion. For example, panzer, 
aircraft, and submarine com~onents were built in several different places 
throughout the Reich, whereupon they were then transported to a receiving 
point and there immediately assembled. In this way, war material was less 
susceptihle to destruction from the air, for the Allies mainly hit the 
larger cities.44 
42Testimony of Albert Speer, June 20, 1946, .l'l!!Q, XVI, p. 4840 
43u. S., The United States Strategic Bom.~ng Survey, F.conomic Re= 
port, Po .5, cited by ~-vl5.lmot, The Struggle £2!: 'Euro:Qe, P• 55; Kesselring, 
"How Hi t.ler Could Have Won, " po 62 .. 
44w.t1mot, ~ Struggle .f2!: Europe, PPo 553-555 .. 
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By the end of 1944 and into 1945, when the &lhr was almost dead, 
Gema.ny was relying on its last main industrial area»- Upper Silesiao 
Beginning in 1940 when the Royal Air Force began its large scal.e bombing 
attacks on the Ruhr, the German armament industry gradually began to 
shift to Upper Silesia, and by 1944 most of the important a.i,uament works 
were in this eastern regiono Up until the time that the Russians cap-
tured Upper Silesia in 1945, the area continued to produce at :f't1l.1 
steam .. 45 The output of ecru. in Silesia was 70,000,000 tons in 1939, 
95,000iOOO tons in 1943, and there was· a further increase in 1944 .. 46 
Due to a lack of long=range bombers, Russia did not bomb Upper Silesia, 
and in 1944 and 1945 the United States was employing its long-range 
super-fortress bombers in the Pacific.47 
War production, of course, is useless unless it is in the hands of 
the soldiers 9 and Ge:rmany0 s chief means of war transportation Wl"e the 
railroads .. As motor fuel became increasingly scarce toward the end or 
1944, the German rail system, one of the most efficient in the world 11 
was increasingly relied upon to handle the shipping of war materiel to 
the fronts. In the fall of 1944 Allied bombers began a concentrated at-
tack on the German rail system, but the damage was slight, and war Ma:= 
teriel continued to moYe to both frontso Conoe:rning both railroads and 
war materiel, a British military observer on the Western Front reported 
in December9 1944j that 
45 
Heinz Guderian, Erlnnemngen eines Sold.a.ten (Heidelberg!) l951)j 
Po 347 9 cited by Wlln1ct9 l'Jl! StNs:12:le for Eu.rope, Po 6160 
46 : 
P~ Wohl., "Germany0 s Hidden Reserves Cannot Last Longsi" Barron°s 
xxv (January 159 1945), p .. 5., 
47Ibid. 
There appears to be no accute shortage of locomotives 
and rolling stock, probably for reason of the shortening of 
German lines of communication as the Allied ring closes in. 
This is progressively adverse to the Allies, as it makes it 
increasingly easy for the Germans to bring up the great 
stocks of weapons and ammunition they unquestionably possess. 
German railway maintenance was still fir~t class and ••• a 
cut line was repaired in about 12 hours.~ 
Even in January, 1945, rail traffic was still moving, and German 
troops destined for the Eastern Front to meet the :Eblssian assault were 
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moved there quickly from the Western Front by rail. Where damage was 
great, by-pass lines were built,49 and it was not until the latter part 
of January that the German rail system began to breakdown.50 
A review of the evidence suggests, therefore, that Germany was in-
deed formidable, and that Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel and 
Generals Westphal and Krebs were wrong, and were possibly harboring the 
unwarranted defeatism that Goebbels constantl.y raged against. Perhaps 
Hitl.er and his Party followers were correct in affirming their convic-
tion that Germany would not be forced to accept defeat and unconditional 
surrender. Perhaps, with the great number of well trained divisions 
still remaining, the stabilized fronts, the defensive victories, an un-
broken people, and a strong war industry, Hitl.er could continue an in-
definite war and simply wear the Allies out. Perhaps the Allies would 
grow tired of pounding at the door, and realizing that it would not open, 
negotiate on terms favorable to the Germans. While Hitler's former 
glory was gone -- a glory that had once extended from the Arctic Circle 
to North Africa, and from the Atlantic Ocean to the Black Sea -- perhaps, 
48Ibid. 
49auderian, Panzer Leader, p. 394. 
50wesley Frank Craven, ~ Army &!:_ Forces ,!.E. World !!!!: .Il, (Chicago, 
1951), III, P• 797. 
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if he held out long enough, some sort of compromise peace could bear-
ranged whereby Germany of 1939 could still remain intact. No doubt 
Hitler, his Nazi followers, and many soldiers thought of a "next round" 
if they could now keep from being ruthlessly crushed from all sides. 
But all of the strength that Germany still possessed in the fall of 
1944 was only enough for a few final battles. As we shall soon see, 
Field Marshals von Rundstedt and Rommel, and Generals Westphal and Krebs 
were not wrong in thinking that Germany was finished in the fall of 1944. 
They and many other German officers were aware of a growing problem in 
the nation's war economy. Hitler also was aware of the problem. He 
took steps to ward it off, but, as with other things, he was too late. 
This problem was oil. By the fall of 1944 Germany was running woefully 
short of oil and fuel. This shortage, which became catastrophic after 
October, was a direct contribution to the rapid death of the Wehrmacht 
and thereby the Third Reich. 
Concentrated Al.lied bombing attacks on the German synthetic oil in-
dustry began in May, 1944. Germany began to feel the effects of a lack 
of oil immediately, but it was not until after October that the problem 
assumed disastrous proportions. After the war, Albert Speer, in dis-
cussing Germany's increased war production during the fall of 1944, had 
this to say: 
All of these attempts Lat increased war production! 
were fruitless, however, since from 12 May 1944 on our 
fuel plants became targets for concentrated attacks from 
the air. 
This was catastrophic. 90 percent of the fuel was 
lost to us from that time on. The success of these at-
tacks meant the loss of the war as far as production was 
concerned; for our new tanks and jet planes were of no 
use without fuel.51 · 
5~Testimony of Albert Speer, June 20, 1946, ~, XVI, p. 484. 
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And a German Plans Division Report of July 8, 1944, was equally candid: 
The greatest danger lies in the threat to the fuel supply. 
Here the destruction of a relatively limited number of 
targets would result in completely paralyzing the German 
Air Force, all motorized units, the military and civilian 
means of 'transportation, and the Navy.52 
The whole fighting concept of the German Army in World War II was 
based on mobility. Mobility was necessary if the Germans were to be 
success:f"ul in their Ardennes counteroffensive. And this mobility called 
for oil and fuel. Even on the defens:ive, mobility was a necessity, and 
especially so in the winter of 1944-1945. If a breakthrough occurred at 
any point on the stabilized front, strategic reserve divisions, armored 
and mechanized infantry, had to be rapidly moved to that place. This 
meant an absolute requirement for oil and fuel. 
It has been shown how Germany was still strong in many respects 
during the fall and early winter of 1944 .. All of Germany's strength, 
however, could not compensate for the Wehrmacht's shortage of oil. It 
is hard to predict how and when Germany would have finally been defeated 
if there had been no bombing attacks on her oil refineries .. If Germany 
had had sufficient quantities of oil to fuel the war machine that was 
still in being in late 1944, the war would have lasted longer; to say how 
much longer would only be conjecture. Nevertheless, millions of German 
soldiers, millions of German civilians ready to struggle on, thousands of 
guns and tanks, tons of anmmnition, were of little value in holding off 
the .Allies. Because of this insufficient quantity of oil, the German 
Army was unable to hold off the Allies and their demand for unconditional 
surrender. This study will attempt to examine in detail how this critical 
52u·. s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, £!! Division, 
Final Report, No .. 109 (Washington, 1947), Po 9o (Hereafter oited as U .. 
So, .Q!!. Division, No .. 1090) 
shortage proved to be a crucial factor in the demise of German arms in 
the winter of 1944-19450 
CHAPTER II 
SOURCES OF THE GERMAN OIL SUPPLY, 19'.3'.3-May, 1944 
On May 2'.3, 19'.39, at a top secret military conference, Hitler de-
clared: "Every country's armed forces or government must aim at a short 
war. The government, however, must also be prepared for a war of 10 to 
15 years' duration. 111 This preparation was given high priority in Hit-
ler's policy after his ascent to power in 19'.3'.3· A great part of this 
planning was designed to insure that the Wehrmacht would have a continual 
supply of oil for future operations. Hitler was aware that Germ.any had 
experienced an oil shortage in World War I. General Ludendorff had de-
scribed in his memoirs how the Germ.an Army's lack of oil became one of 
the main reasons Germ.any asked for an armistice to end the fighting. The 
many German panzer divisions in World War II which were stalled for lack 
of fuel were to repeat the fate of many of the German A~y's vehicles on 
the Western Front in 19180 2 Hitler never ceased to insist that "we must 
be sure of oil for our machine."'.3 
The Fuehrer desired a short war, and it is highly probable that 
blitzkrieg tactics were designed with the fearful thought in mind that 
1~, II, P• 281. 
20eneral Ludendorff, lit!!!£ Memories, 1914-~ (London, n. d .. ), II, 
p .. -659; Engene M. Friedwald, "Oil and the Axis," Contemporary Review, 
CUX (January, 1941), po 86; Ewald Banse, Germany Prepares !2.!:, .!i!!:, ! 
Nazi Theory .2! National· Defense, trans. by Alan Harris (New York, 1934), 
p.40. 
'.3snyder, ~ ~' ! Concise History, !2.J.2.-1945, pp .. '.320-'.32lo 
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Germany would not have enough oil for a war of long duration. 4 In Janu-
ary, 1939, the F.conomic Staff of the German Armed Forces High Command 
published a report which noted that "mineral oil is just as important for 
modern warfare as airplanes, armored vehicles, ships, weapons, and mu-
nitions. ,,5 Hitler and o'trvf were determined that in any future operations 
Germany would not experience an oil shortage as in World War I. With 
this in mind, Hitler and the National Socialists began to increase Ger-
many' s supply of oil. Not only would the German Armed Forces need new 
sources of oil, but they would need a reserve stock of fuel as well. 
Dlring the early years of the Third Reich, the man most concerned 
with increasing Germany's oil, supply was Hjalmar Schacht, the Reich 
Minister of Economics. Hermann Goering succeeded Schacht in 1936, and 
Albert Speer took overall control of the oil supply in 19420 On Septem-
ber 30, 1934, Schacht' s Report 2!l ~ State 2.£ Work .2£ Preparation !2!:. 
~ Economic Mobilization was presented to the Fuehrer. It candidly as-
serted that "the Reich Ministry of Economics has been given the task of 
making economic preparation for war.''? The report showed great concern 
for Germany's inadequate oil supply, and it encouraged by any means the 
production and stockpiling of fuel. 8 This fuel had to come from four 
4walter Levy, "The Paradox of Oil and War," Fortune, XXIV (Septem-
ber, 1941), p. 72. 
5u. s., Adjutant General's Office, Nuernberg Military Tribunals, 
Trials 2f. War Criminals Before 1h! Nuernbe~ Militari Tribunals (Washing-
ton, 1952), XIII, p. 1264. ~Hereafter cited as 1]£.) 
60KWis the abbreviated form of Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the Ger-
man Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) High Command. ~ 
?~, V, P• 126. 
8u. s., War Dept., Office of U. s. Chief Counsel for Prosecution of 
Axis Criminality,~ Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, 1946), VII, 
P• 30?. (Hereafter cited as~.) 
major sources: production of crude oil; development of synthetic oil 
plants; imports of oil; and conservation measures.9 
Before 1933 oil prospecting and producing methods in Germany were 
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archaic and cumbersome. In the late 1920's and early 1930's foreign oil 
companies were operating in Germany alongside the domestic firms, and 
there was much inter-company rivalry. When Hitler came to power he forced 
all oil companies to share oil prospecting information with each other. 
The country's oil reserves were nationalized in 1934, thus granting equal 
rights to all companies. While the welfare of the Reich took precedence, 
foreign oil companies were given much protection as long as they cooper-
ated, and were encouraged to find and produce as much oil as possibleolO 
At this time an abundance of oil was Germany's goal, not the welfare .of 
the companies concernedo 
Geological surveys and drilling activities were stepped up. By 
1934 all provincial geological survey offices had been placed under one 
central authority in Berlin, the Reichsamt ,!:!!! Bodenforschungo Explora-
tion activities from this time on were coordinated from the Berlin office. 
In order that the latest methods of geophysics could be employed, 
9The terms crude oil, natural oil, mineral oil and petroleum all 
mean the same thing -- oil from the eartho Before crude oil can be used 
it must be refined into fuel, lubricating oil, and other products. The 
Wehrmacht, as in any mechanized armed force, was chiefly concerned with 
fuel. Synthetic oil was made from coal, which was distilled into fuel, 
lubricating oil and other productso German imports of oil consisted of 
both crude and refined oil. · 
lOGreat Britain, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, 
Ministry of Fuel and Power, Report on the Petroleum and Synthetic Oil In-
dustry .2f. Germany (London, 1947), p:-iolr:'" (Hereaftercited as Great -
Britain, Report .2.!1 the Petroleum.); Carl H. Ehlers, "Hitler Anxious to 
Have Germany Produce Oil," and "Reich Stimulates Oil Development," ~ 
Oil and Gas Journal, XXXII (December 28, 1933), po 86, and XXXVII (March 
16;" 1939),p. 26. . 
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Germany resurveyed all land s that promised oil.11 Drilling companies 
were encouraged to search for more and more oil. The German government 
advanced fifty per cent of the drilling cost, and if the well-hole proved 
productive, then the company reimbursed the fifty per cent to the govern-
ment. If it was dry, the government absorbed the loss.12 Prior to 1934, 
Germany had only four producing fields. They were located at v.eitze, 
Nienhagen, F.desse, and Oberg, all within twenty miles of Hanover. By the 
end of 1935 there were nine producing fields, new ones having been dis-
covered at Moeline, Gifforn, Fallstei n, Heide, and Forst.13 
Hitler's 1936 Four Year Pl.an for economic development contained much 
on crude oil production. According to the Fuehrer, the new plan was to 
insure that within four years the Reich was to be, as much as possible, 
free of having to import any raw materials, including 011.14 Goering 
took charge of the plan and its target of "readiness for war" in four 
years.15 The plan allocated an additional two million Reichsmarks for 
survey, and Goering boasted that only ten per cent of Germany's subsoil 
! 
had been geophysically tested for oil, implying that the remainder was 
rich in reserves. Many German geologists were not as optimistic as 
11 Ch-eat Britain, Report ..2.U ~ Petroleum 9 Po 104; Levy, "The Paradox 
of Oil and War, 0 P• 72. 
12 Ehlers, "Germany Imports 65 Per Cent of its Motor Fuel Needs," 
~ .Qll. !!22. ~ Journal, XXXV (December 31, 1936), p . 68 . 
13 
, "Reich Stimulates Oil Development," p. 26, and "Germany 
Reports_Fi_v_e-New Oil Fields," The Oil and Gas Journal, XXXIV (December 
26, 1935), p. 137; U. s~, .Q.ll. Division, No7T09, Fig. 13, p. 17. See Map 
No. 1, Appendix A. 
14 
"General G8:ring's New Powers,"~ Economist, CXXV (October 24, 
1936), p. 160. 
15!9!, VII, p. 465. 
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Goering,16 and correctly so. By 1945 Germany had only twenty-eight low 
yield fields.17 
Because of resurveys, new drilling programs, and the Four Year Plan, 
production rapidly increased. For example, from 1872 until 1932 the 
country produced 2,670,000 tons of natural oil. But from 1933 until 
September, 1938, Germany produced 2,466,000 tons of natural oil. Ger-
many's oil fields in 1933 produced only 230,000 tons of petroleum; in 
1934 production was 310,000 tons; in 1935 it reached 430,000 tons; in 
1936 it increased to 440,000; in 1937 it was 450,000 tons; and in 1938, 
crude oil production jumped to 609,000 tons. In 1939, the year the &tro-
pean war began, Germany pumped 890,000 tons of oil from its wellso It is 
interesting for comparison purposes to note that in 1938 England im-
ported 12,000,000 tons of petroleum products while Russia produced 
29,000,000 tons, and the United States produced 164,ooo,ooo tons in the 
same year.18 
Crude oil must be refined, and by 1938 Germany had twenty-seven 
petroleum refineries. Seventeen of them were located in or near Hanover 
68. 
16Ehlers, "Germany Imports 65 Per Cent of its Motor Fuel Needs," p. 
17Frank Reeves, "Status of German Oil Fields," American Association 
2£ Petroleum Geologist's Bulletin, XXX (September, 1946), "p; 1546. See 
Map No. 1, Appendix A. 
18u. s., The United States Strategic Bombing survey, Overall Eco-
nomic Effects Division,~ Effects of Strategic Bombing 2n, ~ German 
~ Economy, No. 3 (Washington, 1945T;" ~· 75. (Hereafter cited as U. s., 
~ Effects ~ Strategic Bombing, No. 3); Robert L. Baker, "Hitler 
Stakes All for Oil," Science Digest, XII (December, 1942), p. 30; Norman 
H. Stanley, "Nazi War Machine is Facing Oil Shortage j" ~ .Q!l and ~ 
Journal, XXXVIII (September 14, 1939), p. 22; Ehlers, "Reich Stimulates 
Oil Development," p. 260 Unless otherwise noted, all quantities of oil 
and fuel in this work will be given in metric tons. A metric ton equals 
2,205 pounds. Approximately 7.5 barrels of petroleum products equals one 
metric tono A barrel equals forty=two gallons. 
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and Hamburgo The total prewar refining capacity of Germany was over 
300 11000 tons a month9 which was quite adequate to handle all of the natu-
ral oil in Germany o By September, 1939 11 Germany had an additional seven 
refineries in Austrla 11 mainly in the Vienna area., These plants could 
refine about 90,000 tons a montho An additional 50 9000 tons a month 
could be refined in the protectorate a~~a ~t C~ eho~l~~· · ~ol 9 
But HitJ.er and his Wehrm.acht commander.s realized that the domestic 
supply of natural .oil would never totally satisfy Ge:rmany0 s needso Ewald 
Banse, a German professor of military science 9 wrote a book entitled 
Germany Prepares !2!, l'!!!:,, in 1934, which stated: 
If Germany continues in the future to be cut off from 
the oil fields of the world without finding an ally among 
the powers that control them9 she will be unable to carry 
on a war; for her own supplies have so far proved utterly 
inadequate. '!he only thing that could restore our freedom 
of movement would be the liquefaction of coalo20 
If Hitler was aware of the Banse book, it no doubt reinforced his own 
views concerning aggressive expansion which he had v-oiced in~ Ksmpfo 
HitJ.er wanted Germany to have an independent oil supply9 and as soon as 
he came to power in 1933, he began demanding an increase in the syn= 
thetic oil output of Germanyo Dul"ing the 1930°s Germ.any became the 
leading nation in the field of synthetic fuelo 
As early as 19021> German scie.ntists began working with the lique= 
faction of coal into oil~ but most of the work rem~ined in the labora= 
tory until the 1920°so By 1933 there were three different types of syn= 
thetic oil plants in Ge:rrnanyo Probably the most important was the 
Bergius hydrogenation processo The chemistry of this process was 
19uo So 9 Q!! Division9 Noo 1091> Figo 80 9 Po ?4o See Map Noo 2~ Ap= 
pendix Ao 
20Banse9 Germany_ Pzoepa.res f~r .!!£_, Po 400 
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complex, but the Germans were equal to the task. Coal, decomposed into 
coke and treated with hydrogen under high pressure, was converted into 
oil which was then distilled into fuelo The Bergius process produced 
good aviation gasoline, motor fuel, and diesel fuel. During the war 
about seventy per cent of the German Armed Forces' synthetic fuel supply 
ca.me from this process. A second type of synthetic plant was the type 
that utilized the Fischer-Tropsch process. The chemistry involved was 
almost the same as that in the Bergius plants, except that more steam 
was needed. The Fischer-Tropsch units produced motor fuel and diesel 
fuel, but no aviation gasoline. Only eight to ten per cent of the Wehr-
macht's synthetic fuel supply ca.me from this process . The remaining type 
of synthetic oil plant utilized the coal tar distillation process, and 
from this a small amount of motor gasoline and diesel fuel, along with 
quantities of benzol, were refined. This process contributed five to 
seven per cent of the Wehrmacht's synthetic fuel supply. The Bergius, 
Fischer-Tropsch, and the coal tar distillation processes were all col-
lectively known as "synthetic oil" and "synthetic fuel., plantso During 
the war these three types of synthetic fuel plants produced almost fifty 
per cent of the German Armed Forces' total supply. The rest was pro-
duced by the natural oil refinerieso21 
Synthetic oil plants were expensive, but to achieve oil independence 
the Germans were willing to pay a great dealo The machinery in a syn-
thetic plant was extremely costJ.y, and a plant of this type took fifteen 
times as much steel as did a natural oil refinery of comparable size. 
21u. s., ,The Effects of Strategic Bombing, Noo 3, po 75; "Oil from 
Coal," Chemical Age, XXXIX-Z July 16, 193~), po 51; William Bayles, "Story 
Behind the Nazi Defeat," American Mercury, LXII (January, 1946), p. 90; 
U.S., .Q!1 Division, No. 109, Figo 15, po 20 . See Graph No. 1, Appendix 
B. 
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Between 1937 and 1944 the Germans used almost 4,380,000 tons of steel in 
their synthetic oil plantso A battle fleet four times as large as the 
United States Navy in 1940 could have been built from this quantity of 
steel. Four and a ha+f tons of bituminous coal and eight tons of brown 
coal were needed to produce one ton of synthetic :f'u.el, and every ton pro-
duced required ten times as many men as were needed in natural oil re-
fining. In terms of money, it cost the Germans four to five times as 
much to produce a gallon of gasoline from coal as it did from natural 
·1 22 01 0 
Nevertheless, many oil, chemical, and coal companies in Germany 
entered the synthetic :f'u.el businesso A~er 1933 the German government 
granted these companies long-term contracts with a price that would guar-
antee the company a profit. 23 Firms like Krupp, Braunkohlen Benzin A. 
G., Ruhr Chemie A. G., Wi~tershall, Ruhr Benzin A. G., and I. G. Farben 
all made use of the government's profitable terms to manufacture synthet-
ic :f'u.el. In 1933 Ruhr Benzin A.G. built the first Fischer-Tropsch plant 
at Oberhausen-Holten in the Ruhr. But the giant was Io G. Farben. In 
1927 this firm built the first Bergius hydrogenation unit at Leuna near 
Leipzig, and by 1933 it was producing synthetic :f'u.el at the rate of 
120,000 tons a year~ In December of that same year I. G. Farben and the 
Reich Minister of F,conomics made an agreement whereby the firm guaranteed 
the government a specified volume of synthetic :f'u.el, and in return was to 
receive a set price for that amounto IH.tler himself approved this trans~ 
action. In 1938 I. G. Farben built another big hydrogenation plant at 
22u. S., .Q!1. Division, No. 109, Po 15; R. Lane, "World 0 s Oil Supply 
vs. Estimated War Requirements," Annalist, LV (March 28, 1940), p. 452. 
23 Levy, "The Paradox of Oil and War," p. 72. 
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Poelitz near stettino During the war both the Leu:na. and Poelitz plants 
together had an annual production rate of 1,200,000 tons of ruei. 24 
By 1935 Germ.any had five Bergius plants on stream, all having a 
total annual capacity of 800,000 tons of' f'uelo In the same year there 
were four Fischerm'l'ropsoh plants producing 100,000 tons of fuel per 
yearo25 Under the impetus of the Four Year Plan of 1936, production in-
creased immediately. By September, 1939, Germany had seven large Bergius 
units, seven Fischer-Tropsch units, and several smaller coal tar distil-
lation uni ts all producing synthetic fuel o When the Wehrmacht invaded 
Poland on September 1, 1939, Germany's synthetic oil plants were pro ... 
ducing 2,300,000 tons of fuel .a yearo At that time there were four more 
Bergius and two Fischer-Tropsch units under constructiono 26 
Imports formed the third major source of oil, and huge amounts were 
purchased abroad during the 1930 9 s. A growing number of automobiles and 
increased industrialization in Germ.any contributed to this growing need. 
Hitler and the Wehrmacht also realized that if the war came, a blockade 
or German North Sea ports was highly probable, and this would end non .. 
European imports or oilo A reserve stock would, therefore, be necessary 
for the Wehrmacht to carry out operations .. Importation of oil was the 
quickest way to increase the war stock or fuel, and· it was much cheaper 
to import oil than to manufacture it in the synthetic plants. Im.ports of 
24TWC, VIII, Po 1263; U. Se, Oil Division, No. 109, Figo BO, po 74; 
"Oil From Coal," p. 51; "German Gasoline,'' Business ~, M.arch 9, 1935, 
P• 34; Stanley, "Nazi War Machine is Facing Oil Shortage," po 22. 
25"Germany0 s Oil Supplies,~• !b!, Economist, CXXXI (May 28, 1938), Po 
469 .. 
260. s., 1ll2, Effects .2! Strategic Bombing, No. 3, po 73; "Oil Situa ... 
tion in Germ.any," Foreign Commerce Weekly, XIII (December 11, 1943), Po 
27; Bayles, "Story Behind the Nazi Defeat," p. 900 
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oil were mueh greater tr.an both domestic crude oil production and synthet= 
tic oil p:roductiono Most of Gel"Iliany-0 s imported oil in the 1930 ° s came 
from the lhtch, ~~t Indies 51 the United State.s 9 Russia. 51 Mexico, and Rn-
ma:r.iao27 In 1935 imports from all countries totaled 351 478 9000 tons, in 
1936 they were 4,000 51 000 tons 9 in 1937 they increased to 4 9160,000 tons, 
and in 1938 the figure jumped to 5,000,000 tons~ or this 1938 figure, 
351800,000 tons came from overseas countries, and the remaining 1,200,000 
tons were imported from Ru.mania, Russia, and Estoniao In 1939 Germany 
imported 5,165,000 tons of oil products, a majority of this arriving be= 
fore the blockade begano The highest level of imports in the history of 
the Third Reich was during the eight months before the war begano28 The 
rise in oil imports not only coincided with Germany0 s greater need for 
civilian oil~ but illustrates Hitler 0 s contention that war was on the im, ... 
mediate horizono 
The Germans still had one final method of obtaining oil and fuel 
before offensive operations commenced in 19390 This was by applying 
rigid conservation measures to both production and consumption of f'uelo 
As early as 1937 the government required the oil refining companies to 
mix benzol=alcohol with their produced gasolinej thereby "stretching" ito 
Before 1937 German gasoline had only a ten per cent benzol=alcohol 
27Levy9 "The Paradox of Oil and War9 " po 72~ Btmjamin To Br>ooks, 
"Petroleum for Germany at War 9 " Industrial~ Engineering Chemistry, 
XVII (November 10 9 1939)1) Po 679i "Petroleum in Germany; Abstractj)" 
Journal of the Institute of Petroleum Technologists3 .Abstracts 9 XX (1934), 
po 588Ao~-== -
8 . 2 Uo So 9 ~ Effects £!'.. strategic Bombing9 Noo 39 PPo 74=75, "Ger= 
many0 s Oil Supplies!!" "Germany0 s Raw Material Suppliesj" and "Ger.niany0 s 
War Stocks!)" ~ EconomistSJ CXXXVIII (March 251 1940) ll Po 366, CXXVI 
(Janual"j1' 16, 1937) 9 Po 1129 and CXXV (April 15, 1939)~ Po 1620 
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content, but thereafter the percenta.ge was increased to sixteen per 
cent. 29 And before the war began, the government offered civilians 600 
to 1,000 Reichmarks if they would agree to convert their automobiles from 
gasoline to gas propelled unitso Another conservation measure was the 
rationing of gasoline for civilian consumption which was in effect by 
1937030 Rationing and conservation of civilian fuel appeared a bit 
ironical, since it was at the time when Hitler was building the ~ = 
bahnen across Germany, and was planning the ''peoples' car.•• 
Thus, domestic crude oil, synthetic oil, imports of oil, and conser-
vation of oil contributed to Germany's increased supply of oil before the 
waro Consumption, however, rose along with production, and it was very 
difficult for Hitler to increase his reserve stock of fuelo More auto-
mobiles and a rapid rate of industrialization, particularly in the arma-
ment industries, aU required increasing amounts of oilo In 1933 the 
German economy consumed 3,375,000 tons of oil products; by 1938 consump-
tion had risen to 7,290,000 tons a yearo3l 
Even though consumption was on the rise by the time Germany invaded 
Poland, Hitler still mana.ged to enter the war with 1,100,000 tons of re-
serve fuelo32 Of course this was not the total amount of oil products 
29 11German Fuel Regulations Revised," Automotive Industries, LXXVI 
(June 26, 1937), p~ 94le . 
30Baker, "Hitler Stakes A.11 for Oil," po 30; J. P. O'Donnell, 
''Britain• s Blockade Intensifying Oil Famine in Europe j" .Ih!il .Q!l... !.U9, ~ 
Journal, XXXIX (September 19, 1940), Po 61. 
31Friedwald, "Oil and the Axis," po 780 
32u. So, .Q!! Division, Noo 109, Po 280 Other sources, however, dis~ 
agree on exactly how much fuel reserve the Wehrmacht had available on 
September 1, 19390 The following sources suggest that Hitler had any-
where from 4,500,000 to 7,000,000 tons of oil products: Fredrick Po 
Hallin, "Russia• s Oil and Hi tle:r6 s Need," Atlantic Monthly, CLXIX (June, 
1942), Po 677; Brooks, "Petroleum for Germany at War," p .. 679; Levy, 
available, but for the Wehrmacht and for the purpose of this writing, 
fuel was and is of prime importance, for approximately sixty-two per 
cent of Germany's oil products consisted of aviation gasoline, motor 
gasoline, and diesel fuel. 3'.3 
3'.3 
Was this quantity sufficient for modern war? After the war in 
Europe began, many oil experts and others began predicting the length of 
time the German Armed Forces could continue to opera.ta on its fuel sup-
ply. Most commentators gave Germany only a few months in which to snatch 
victory before running out of fuel. Hugh Gibson, the former United 
States Ambassador to Belgium, predicted a severe shortage of fuel for 
Germany by the end of 1939: 
From the German point of view the question of oil is more 
urgent than the need for food and more vital than it was 
in 1914, for the army has been motorized to an extent 
which has to be seen to be believed ••• o Those who are 
qualified to know believe that stocks of oil and certain 
materials will just about last out this year, and that 
Germany will begin to· feel the pinch early in 1940034 
If the Army and Luftwaffe noticed an oil "pinch" early in 1940, it was 
"The Paradox of Oil and War," p .. 720 .Q!!, 12:iY:.!E:.2!!, however, is the more 
accurate source, for in 1939 Germany produced 890,000 tons of crude oil, 
2,300,000 tons of synthetic oil, and imported 5,165,000 tons of oil, or a 
total of 8,355,000 tonso Consumption in 1938 wa.s 7,290,000 tonso Sub-
stracting this from the 8,355,000 tons leaves Germany with 1,065,000 tons 
with which to begin the waro Sixty per cent of this amount must be con-
sidered as fuelo One million and one hundred thousand tons is therefore 
accepted as the most realistic figureo 
33u. Se, .Q!l Division, Noo 109, Figo 16, p. 21., See Graph Noo 2, 
Appendix B. The remaining thirty-eight per cent of Germany's oil prod-
ucts consisted of fuel oil,. (ten per cent), lubricating oil (eight per 
cent), and miscellaneous products and residue (twenty per cent)o See U., 
s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Q!!. Division; Final~-
port Appendix (2nd ed., , Washington, 1947), p. 21; a.nd "Germany's Lubri-
cating Oil," ,.Ih! Economist, CXLI (October 11, 1941), p .. 448. 
34stanley, "Nazi War Machine Is Facing Oil Shortage," Po 220 
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only slighto In May, 1940, the Wehmacht plunged into France and the 
Lowlands. The Western Offensive was a success, and the Armed Forces did 
not slow down for a lack of fuel. Yet, Norm.an Ho Stanley, writing in 
the May 30, 1940, issue of ~ ~ !!!2_ ~ Journal opined that if France 
could hold off Germany for thirty days, the Wehrmacht would be out of 
fuelo35 This, of course, proved wrongo After France fell, the unleash-
ing of the IiUftwaffe on England was strong evidence that the Weh:rma.cht 
was not out of fuel.. 
The oil "experts" continued their predicting into 1941. In the 
January, 1941, issue of Contemporary Review, Eugene M. Friedwal.d argued 
that the German Armed Forces had available oil stocks for only a four-
month intensive military campaigno Even the discerning Economist took 
the view that Germany would be out of fuel in a few monthso36 Both pre ... 
dictions proved wrongo Not only did Hitler have enough :f'uel in April, 
1941, to throw the Wehrmacht into the Balkans, but in June there was 
plenty of fuel to begir: Operation Barbarossa =Q the awesome attack on 
Russia. Even after the 1941 Eastern Offensive began, many observers 
still insisted that Germany was doomed because of the heavy fuel require-
ments of the Wehmacht in the Easto In October, 1941, the Economist pre-
dieted that a continuation of German operations on the Jr.astern Front 
would soon bring about a fuel shortageo3? Major General Piotr Kotoff of 
the Soviet Tank Army informed a New York Tim~ reporter in December, 
1941, that if Hitler continued his present scale of offensive fighting, 
35nFrench Inquiry May Indicate More Active Ex:port Market," ~.Ql!, 
~ ~ Journal, XXXIX (May 30, 1940), p .. lOo 
36Friedwald, ''Oil and the Axis,'' po 8.5; "Is Nazi Europe Short of 
Oil?,"~ Economist, en. (January 25, 1941), Po 1170 
37"Germa.ny' s Lubricating Oil," Po 447. 
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he would be out or fuel within two and a half to three months.38 Both 
predictions proved erroneous. In 1942 the Wehrmacht began the great 
drive for the Caucasus., Several limited offensives were launched in 1943 
on the Ea.stern Front, and in 1944 the Army and Inftwaffe carried out an 
orderly retreat from Russia. It was, in fact, not until January, 1945, 
that fuel problems on the Ea.stern Front became acute. 
How can one explain the consistent errors on the part of observers 
who were in a position to judge the German capacity? Certainly it would 
appear that they had logic and statistics on their side, especially if 
one remembers that the Wehrmaoht had a fuel reserve of only 1,100,000 
tons, or enough for about three months of fighting when the war begano39 
Du.ring the seventeen-day blitz into Poland, the Wehrmacht consumed an 
estimated 200,000 tons of fuel. 40 Du.ring the 1940 Western Offensive, 
from the time of the April attack on Denmark and Norway until the end of 
the Battle of Britain in November, Wehrma.cht fuel consumption was almost 
1,500,000 tons. 41 Beginning with the Eastern Offensive in 1941, Hitler 
was to be constantly at war, without an opportunity for rest and refit-
ting. From June, 1941, until Au.gust, 1941, Wehrmacht fuel consumption in 
Russia was 500,000 tons per month, but from September until the Dec.ember 
halt before M:>scow, the amount decreased to about 350,000 tons per month .. 
From December, 1941, until August, 1944, Wehrmacht consumption averaged 
38New York Times, December 5, 1941, Po 5. 
39u. s., .Q!1. Division, Noo 109, ppo 1, 170 
40The :figure of 200,000 tons is estimated on the basis o:f subsequent 
rates of consumption on the Western Fronto See, however, P., Wohl, "Ger-
many's Hidden Reserves Cannot Last Long," p" 5; Eugene Mo Friedwald, .Q!!. 
!m!, the War (London, 1941), po 38; and Hallin, ''Russia II s Oil and Hi tler 0 s 
Need-;;r'"p7'"68o, for estimates of approximately 500,000 tons consumption 
for the Polish campaign. 
41 Friedwald, "Oil and Axis," Po 84; Ue s., Oil Division, No. 109, 
Fig. 25, Po 30.. See Graph Noo 3, Appendix Bo -
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between 300,000 and 400,000 tons per montho Consumption increased to 
about 400,000 tons per month during the siege of Stalingrad, and remained 
at this level during the retreat from Russia and France in 19440 Added 
to the German Armed Forces• fuel consumption must be that of the civilian 
economy. After the Polish campaign, and up until 1943, civilian fuel 
consumption averaged about 100,000 tons per montho During 1943, civilian 
consumption decreased to about 75,000 tons per month, and by the summer 
of 1944, it was down to a trickleo 42 
Yet despite these tremendous rates of consumption, the Wehrmacht was 
still able to maintain a shaky three-month supply of fuel until May, 
19440 By the end.of 1939 stocks were down to 941,000 tons, but after the 
Western Offensive fuel stocks were at their highest level=-1,500;000 tonso 
Stocks remained at this level until the beginning of Barbarossa, and then 
in January, 1942, they were down to 800 9000 tons, or enough for about six 
weeks of hard 1941-type fightingo This amount remained constant through ... 
out 1942 until Germany went on the.defensive on all fronts. Stocks gra= 
dually began to rise in 1943j and by May, 1944, when the Allied air of-
fensive on oil began, the Armed Forces had access to a 1,372,000 ton 
' I 
supply of reserve f'uelo43 
In 1939 domestic crude oil production was 890,000 tons; by 1944 it 
42Wolfgang Birkenf eld, ~ Synthetisch Treibstoff, !211=!2!ti ( G8tm 
tingen, 1964), po 1550 See Graph Noo 3, Appendix Bo 
43u. So, .Q1;l Division, Noo 109~ po 28; However, Birkenfeld, in~ 
synthetisch Treibstoff, po 159j places the April, 1944, reserve at 
1,137,000 tonso See also U. So, Foreign Economic Administration, Enemy 
Branch, Studi £!. ~ Interagenqz Drafting; Committee .2!! ,2 Treatment .2£ 
..!:.h2, German Petroleum Industr~ from~ standpoint !2£. International~-
curit;y:, No,. 6 (Washington, 194~po 280 (Hereafter cited as U. s., 
Study .2!, !a! Interagenci Drafting Committee, Noo 60) See also Graph Noo 
3, Appendix B. · 
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reached 1,984,000 tonso For the latter year Germany had planned a crude 
oil production rate of 1,969,000 tons; she was thus ahead of scheduleo44 
This sizeable increase was due in part to the annexation of Austriao Im-
mediately after the Anschluss, German technicians and geologists moved 
into the Zistersdorf fields, about thirty miles north of Vienna. Zisters-
dorf was mentioned in Goering's Four Year Plan, and it quickly became the 
richest field in Greater Germanyo In 1942, for example, 750,000 tons of 
oil were extracted from the field, and in 1943 the amount was 1,000,000 
tons.45 
.After 1940, and with the blockade in effect, Germany was still able 
to import petroleum from ten European countries who were either in al-
liance with, or occupied by Germanyo They were Albania, Czechoslovakia, 
Estonia, France, Holland, Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia, Poland, and Rumania, 
The three countries producing the lowest quantities were Czechoslovakia, 
Italy, and Yugoslaviao In 1943 their combined crude production for the 
year amou.nted to only 90,000 tonso The three highest oil producing 
countries in 1943 were Rumania, Hungary, and Poland. In that year Rnmania 
produced 5,266,000 tons, Hungary produced 840,000 tons, and Poland pro-
duced 442,000 tons.o From 1941 until 1943 Germ.any, its allies, and the oc ... 
cupied countries produced each year almost 8,700,000 tons or crude oil • 
.After August, 1944, total production available to all countries under 
German domination dropped to 7,100,000 tons as a result of the capture of 
Ploesti, Rumania, by the Red Army.46 Even though Germany and all 
44u. s., Study .2!, .ib!, Intera.gency Drafting Committee, No. 6, po 270 
45"Austrian Fields, Germans' La.st stronghold of Petroleum," National 
Petroleum News, XXXVII (February 7, 1945), po 36. 
46 U. s., Study .2,! ~ Interagency Drafting Committee, Noo 6, po 28. 
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countl"ies under its contN>l produced over 8 90009000 wns of oil per yearsi 
this does not mean that the Wehmacht had access to this amoonto For ex-
ample,, in 194311 300 9000 tons of' the 840 9000 tons of oil that Hungary pro= 
dmed were used by Hungary itself o And in the case <,f Rwna.nia. .almost 
2,000,000 tons or the over 511 000 9000 tons pl'Cllduced were used by lw.manian 
f'orceso In beth cases9 the remainder ns purchased by Germanyo47 
After the war began11 and up until May, 194411 Germany had no problem 
in refining its avail.able crude oilo In addition to the earlier mentioned 
refineries in Gel"tl1any'11 Austria9 and Czechcslovald..a.9 the ~hrmacht could 
depend on both the c:rude oil supply and the huge refinery complex at 
, Ploesti, Rwnaniao Ml.ch of the Rwnaman oil entering Germany had been re,. 
fined at Ploesti .. Al.roost one=third of Germany's oil supply came from Ru ... 
mania and the great complex at Ploesti.o The plants at Ploesti a.lone could 
refine 29000 9000 tons of crude oil per yearo48 
Sym.hetic oil p?"<llduction was also stepped upo Above it was noted 
that before the German Armed Forces invaded France and the Lowlands, Ger= 
many already had several large synthetic plants cm streamo 49 By 1944 Ger= 
many had twenty=f'ive major synthetic fuel plants operatingo The three 
smallest were at Lu.etzkendorf, Auschwitz (Poland), and Schaff'gotsch 
(Poland) 9 and they were produc.dng respectively 1 9000 tonsil 2 51 000 tons, 
and :3S>300 tons of fuel per montho Leuna. 9 Poelitz, and Bruex (Sudetenland) 
47":Efu.:ngary, an Important Oil Producer, 19 Foreign Co:mmer,ee Weekl:y, XV 
(May 6s, 1944), p .. 29; "Oil Situa:tion in Germany9 " po 280 · 
48The War Reports or General of the~ George Co MarshallS> General 
of' the Arm.y Ho Ho Arnola';° and FieetAdmiral Ernest Jo =King (Philadelphiall 
i947T; Po 3790 =(Herea;tter cited as ~ War ReportsJ~ "Bombers Advancing, 
Rllssians Threaten Hitler0 s Oil Supplies9"Business ~)1 Feb.i!"IJ'.ary 191) 
1944S> p .. 4ls George Reisss, "Smashing or Refineries Seen Biggest Factor in 
Germany0 s Fa.11 9 " National Petroleum. News, XXXVII (October 10 9 1945.h Po 530 
49uo So, Oil m.visions, Noo 109!1 Po '.36; Bayles, ••story Behind the 
Nazi Defeat," ~91o 
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were the sites of the three largest, and each produced 50,000 tons of 
syntheti¢ :fuel p~r montho Daring mos-"c of the war, Germany had all 
twenty=five Sjlh'C,}Jlef.;;ie, oil -p_lants in op~;r,ati<:mo T'nese plants were mainly 
·-·- ... _. ~· ·. . -· 
concentrated in the Ruhrll in Middle Germany near Leipzig9 and in Upper 
Silesiao50 
The synthetic oil plants helped counteract the blockadeo5l In 1939 
synthetic oil production was 29 300,000 tons per yearo By April, 1944, 
all synthetio plants together were producing 5,800,000 tons per annumo52 
From this supply, Germ.any met about half of its oil needso53 
German Ar:rrw seizures of fuel were another source of supply after 
1939, but were for the most part insig1tlficant and proba'bly amounted only 
to a two month0 s supply altogethero Ihring the 1940 Western Offensive 
the Army captured in France and the Low Countries 365,000 tons of motor 
gas~line 9 220,000 tons of aviation gasolinet and 65,000 tons of diesel 
fue1}4 The Germans captured 700 damaged oil wells at Maikop in the Uk-
raine,55 but before production could be restored to an adequate level the 
Wehrm.acht was being pushed back toward Germanyo 
Stringent fuel conservation measures can be considered the last 
50 See Map No .. 29 Appendix Ao 
51 Bo Bo Williams 11 "Believes Diesels and Synthetic Oil Preclude Nazi 
Defeat for Lack of Fuel~" Steel~ CXI (July 20, 1942), Po 570 
52u. s .. , Oil Division~ Noo 109, Fig .. 15, po 20~ Gireat Britain9 Report 
!m !b2. Petroleuiii; p .. lo 
5:3u. So, ~ Effects .2£ Btrategic Bombing, Noo 3, po 750 
54Birkenfield 9 ~ synthetisch Triebstoff 9 po 152; U. So, .QY.. 12!.-
vision9 Noo 1099 Po 25. 
55.,Nazi ·Nightmareg Russia0 s New Successes Deprive Reich or Natural 
Oil Resources.," Business ~ 11 January 23, 1943, Po 350 
40 
source or the German oil supply during the war. By November, 1940, all 
building elevators were stopped so that oil could be conserved. In May, 
1941, the ~rm.ans began installing extraction :machinery in industrial 
plants to obtain oil from rags and from industrial waste. At times, in 
order to conserve oil, :many Germ.an homes were without heat.56 Probably 
the most productive conservation measure was civilian fuel rationing. On 
the eve of the Polish invasion, civilians were allowed 200,000 tons of 
fuel per month, but immediately thereafter drastic outs were imposed, and 
the fuel ration went down to approximately 100,000 tons per :month and 
less. After April, 1944, :more drastic outs were carried out. Hundreds of 
automobiles were converted to wood-gas generating units.57 All of these 
measures, of course, helped ease the fuel situation, but it called for 
considerable sacrifice on the part of the civilian population. 
Thus, while Germany went to war with only 1,100,000 tons of reserve 
fuel, by May l, 1944, stocks were still at 1,372,000 tons. Until May, 
1944, consumption never exceeded stockso Yet, though the Wehrmacht ex-
perienced no serious crisis in the fuel supply until the bombing raids on 
oil targets began, the whole fuel situation up until that time was still 
extremely precarious, with only a three montht1s reserve availableo5B If 
anything happened to this reserve, the~ and the Luftwaffe would be in 
serious difficulty. This :menace materialized in the form of British and 
56ta.ne, "World's Oil Supply vs. Estimated War Requirements," p. 452; 
David L. Wosk, "Mountains Give Soviet Oil Fields Stout Protection," ~ 
Oil and Gas Journal, XL (December 25, 1941), Po 78; Robert Eo Wilson, 
"011Teeas-of ~s Powers," Independent Petroleum Association£! American 
Monthl;x;, ID (May, 1941), Po 20. 
57u. s., Oil Division, No. 109, pp. 25, 27; Birkenfield, R!I, synthe-
tisch Triebstott. p. 158; I!!i!Q., VIII, po 12630 See Graph No., 3, Appendix 
B. 58 Birkenfield, ~ s:ynthetisch Triebstoff, p. 159., 
American bombers. Oil refineries and synthetic targets were destroyed 
from the air, and from May, 1944, on, the Armed Forces used more fuel 
than the oil industry could produceo59 
59 Ibid. See also Graph Noo 3, Appendix B .. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EXHAUSTION OF THE GERMAN OIL SUPPLY, MAY, 191.14 ... MARCH, 1945 
On M.ay 1, 1944, total German fuel production stood at a level of 
380,000 tons per month, and Wehrm.aoht reserves amounted to 1,370,000 tonso 
By March 31, 1945, motor gasoline and diesel fuel production combined were 
less than 80 9000 tons per month and still falling, aviation gasoline pro= 
duction was zero, and Wehrmacht fuel reserves were exhaustedo The primary 
reason for this rapid decline in production and exhaustion of reserves 
was the Allied air o:ff'ensive on the German oil industry which began in 
May, 19440 The United States Strategic Air Force (USSAF) and the Royal 
Air Foree (RAF) bombed the oil industry so thoroughly that after this 
date German production never again surpassed Wehrmaoht oonswnptiono1 If 
it had not been for the Allied air offensive on oil, the German Armed 
Forces could have maintained a badly needed :f'u.el reserveo As it was, the 
three-month reserve supply of fuel was rapidly consumed, there was no 
means or replenishing it, and the German Army and Inftwarfe found them"" 
selves facing disaster. 
Attacks on the oil industry had begun much earlierp of courseo As 
early as 1940 ninety per cent or the German synthetic oU plants and 
' ' 
eighty per cent or the natural oil refineries had been attackedo In 1941 
the British carried out almost 400 air raids on oil installations 9 and 
1uo So, Oil Divisiong Noo 109, PPo 2, 21; Uo So, The Effects of Stra= 
tegic Bombingj Noo 3, Po 80., See Graph Noso 2 and 39 Appendix Bo - ......_.,, 
42 
4,., ) 
by 1943 American bombers had joined in the attack on German oil targetso 2 
Nevertheless, with the exception of the Ploesti raid, it was not until 
after May, 1944, that German oil plants sustained major damageo3 
. This early American attack on the refinery complex at Ploesti, Ru.-
mania., in 1943 indicates that the Allies had been long aware of .. the im-
portance of destroying German oil production. For the Germans it was a 
prelude of worse to come. In June, 1942, American bombers based in the 
Near Ea.st made an unsuccessful.raid on Pl.oestio Before the Americans 
struck again, they practiced on a full-sized layout of the refinery com-
plex in North Africao On August 1, 1943, 200 North African-based bombers 
of the Fifteenth U. s. Air Force struck Ploesti at low levelo Anti-
aircraft fire was extremely heavy, and twenty of the bombers were losto 
About fifty per cent of the refinery complex was destroyed, and according 
to General Eisenhower, the raid was ."reasonably successfulo"4 The Germans 
and Rumanians quickly repaired most of the damage, however, and it was not 
until the summ.er of 1944 that Pl.oesti was completely destroyedo 
By this time the crucial role of oil in Hitler's war effort was fu.Lly 
appreciated by the Allies, and almost two years of planning lay behind the 
decision of the USSAF and the RAF to concentrate on oil targetso As early 
as 1942 the Allied grand strategy had called for a concentrated air as-
sault on Germany's oil industry, but it was then deemed unwise to attempt 
such a venture until the U o Se Eighth Air Force had been bull t up in 
2"Axis Drive on Ru.mania May Be Aimed at Near East Oil," The Oil and 
Gas Journal, XXXIX (October 10, 1940), Po 21; Hellin, "Rll.ssiai's~a'nd"' 
'iRiter' s Need," po 68lo 
3u. s., ~ Division, No .. 109, p .. 1 .. 
4Snyder, The War, A Concise Risto~, ~=~, po 321; 
Pounded," Newsweek, XXI! (August 9, 193), pp .. ~9; UQ So, 
.2!, Strategic Bombing, Noa 3, Pi\ 750 
"Ploesti 
The Ef'f ects 
--
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Britaino The RAF was to bomb oil in the Ruhr; the U. So Eighth was to 
strike central, northern, and eastern Germany, western Czechoslovakia, 
and western Poland; while the U. So Fifteenth was to bomb oil installa-
tions in southern Germany, southern Poland, Austria, Hungary, and Ru-
mania. The Americans were to bomb by day using pinpoint bombing equip-
ment, and the British were to employ saturation bombing by night.5 In 
1943 the Eighth Air Force was ready to begin flying with the RAF, and the 
Fifteenth Air Force in the Mediterranean was also up to strength. But 
even then, it was first necessary to neutralize Luftwaffe fighter pro-
duction before oil targets could be hit with a reasonable measure of 
success. German pilots were still taking a heavy toll of invading 
British and American bombers. 
By 1943 the Allied bombers were carrying out near suicide attacks on 
Luftwaffe fighter plants located in Regensburg, Oschersleben, Ma.rienburg, 
and Wiener Neustadt. In a series of raids in January and February, 1944, 
the American and British Air Forces methodically bombed the German air= 
craft industry. These were the biggest aircraft production raids of the 
war and a necessary prelude to the oil offensiveo Shortly after the 
raids, destruction estimates of Luftwaffe fighter aircraft ran as high as 
fifty per cent. 6 Albert Speer rectified the damage, however, and air-
craft manufacturing was back to normal within two monthso Despite Speer0 s 
exertions, the lack of fuel would soon keep most of the German Air Force 
grounded for good. 
5Arthur Gordon, "After D Day," ~ Force, XXVII, Noo 8 (August, 
1944), p. 6; "Striking Oil," !k, Force, XXVII, No. 12 (December, 1944), 
p. 32. 
6charles J. V. M.irphy, "The War of the Bombers," Fortune, XXXI 
(January, 1945 ) , p. 119; Arthur Gordon, "Air Pincers Over Ellrope, " !!:.!:, 
Force, XXVII, Noo 4 (April, 1944), pp. 6-80 
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The systematic "oil offensive" began on May 12, 1944, with four 
heavy attacks on synthetic oil targets in central Gemany, including I. 
G. Farben' s extens.ive Launa plant near Leipzigo The Luftwaffe resisted 
fiercely, but the strikes continued, with the RAF bombing the Ru.hr syn-
, 
thetic oil works during the third week in Ma.y .. 7 On June 8, 1944, General 
Carl A. Spaatz, commander of the USS.AF, defined his objective: "Primary 
strategic aim of U., s .. Strategic Air Forces is to deny oil to enemy air 
forces .. "8 From this date until the end or the war the Allied strategic 
air forces gave Geman oil targets top priority.9 
On June 10 the Americans bombed Italian refineries near the Adria.tic 
Sea. Hanover was hit ha.rd on June 12 and 15. On June 1'.3 the Fifteenth. 
Air Force struck refineries in lfu.ng~ and Czechoslovakia. A week later 
2,000 Al.lied bombers and 1,100 fighter escorts attacked refineries and 
synthetic oil plants in Germany .. Twelve different installations were hit, 
including works at Poelitz, Hamburg, Misburg, Magdebu.rg, Ostermoor, and 
Sterkrade.10 The raids continued at the same intensity throughout the 
summer and provoked high level German concern. On August 25, 1944, Speer 
sent a memorandum to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of Staff of OICW, 
in which he expressed growing anxiet;y over the damage to German oil 
7u. s .. , .Q!l Division, No .. 109, p .. l; Paul Wohl, "Allied Air Fleets 
Throttle Nazi Oil Su.pply: Mobility of Geman Army Threatened by Attacks 
on Refineries," Barron• s, XXIV (July 10, 1944), p. 11.. . 
8 U.S., Oil Division, No. 109, P• 1. 
9Forrest Co Pogue, !h2, Su.preme Command (United States !m !n, lrbrld 
War 1!,: European Theater .2!, Operations) (Washington, 1954), po '.316. 
(Hereafter cited as Pogue, The Supreme Commando) 
lOW'ohl, "Allied Air Fleets Throttle Nazi Oil Su.pply: Mobility of 
German Army Threatened by Attacks on Refineries," poll; Gordon, "After 
D Day," p .. 60 
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production.11 By the end of September, the Al.lies had attacked sixty-
nine natural oil refineries at least once, and all major Bergius and 
Fischer-Tropsch plants had been bombed at least twice. The American 
pinpoint daylight bombing attacks were hindered by bad weather in No-
vember, but more bombs were dropped to compensate for the elements, 
thereby keeping German production down. Eleven hundred Eighth Air Force 
bombers and 900 fighters again bombed I. G. Farben's big synthetic oil 
plant at Leuna on November 2, inflicting immense damage. When both the 
F.astern and Western Fronts were collapsing at the end of January, 1945, 
the Germans still controlled thirty-six refineries, but seventeen of them 
were completely knocked out and almost all of the remainder were badly 
damaged and barely operating. Only two synthetic fuel plants were oper-
ating by the end of February.12 
By this time the destruction of the German oil industry was virtual-
ly complete. On the eve of the oil offensive, fuel production was 
380,000 tons per month. Two weeks after the offensive began, production 
was down to 320,000 tons per month. By the time of the Normandy invasion 
production was 250,000 tons per month and falling. As the Russian and 
Western Allied advances neared the German frontier in September, fuel 
production dipped to 120,000 tons per month. The bad weather in Novem-
ber, which hindered Allied bombing, gave the Germans a respite, and pro-
duction increased to 150,000 tons per month. But by December it was 
11Letter from Speer to Keitel, August 25, 1944, U. s., The National 
Archives, Records 2:£. Head1uarters, German Armed Forces High ~and, Part ll (Alexandria, Va., 1960 , Microfilm Roll No. 528, Item Wi/IF 172a, 
Frame No. 1700171. (Hereafter cited as U. s., Records 2:£. Headquarters, 
German Armed Forces High Command, Part II.) 
12u. s., ..!mt Effects 2:£_ Strategic Bombin~, No. 3, pp. 78-79; ''Strik ... 
ing Oil," P• 31; New York Times, March 20, 19 5, Po 4. 
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again rapidly declining, with the storage tanks being almost completely 
dry by April, 1945. During April production was only five per cent of 
what it had been before the air attacks on oil began.13 German pro-
duction plans of January, 1944, had called for 467,000 tons of fuel for 
April, 1945;14 less than 20,000 tons were actually produced. 
Two important factors made the 1944-1945 Allied oil offensive parti-
cularly effective: an increased bomb tonnage and repeated attacks on 
individual targets. Neither factor was present before May, 1944. Prior 
to May 12, 1944, the RAF and the USSAF had dropped 509,206 tons of bombs 
on Germany and occupied furope, but only 1.1 per cent of this amount, or 
5,670 tons, was aimed at enemy oil targets. Between the beginning of the 
oil offensive and VE day, 1,477,217 tons of bombs were dropped on enemy 
targets, and almost 13 per cent of this amount, or 191,256 tons, was 
aimed at German oil installations.15 Bomb tonnage dropped on oil targets 
in the last year of the war was thirty-five times as great as it had been 
during the previous four years of bombingo 
Three examples will best illustrate the repeated attacks on indi-
vidual targets. The Meerbeck Fischer-Tropsch plant in Rheinpreussen on 
the Lower Rhine produced 6,000 tons of synthetic fuel per month, or lo? 
per cent of Germany's total synthetic production. Its chief products 
13For production figures for April, May, and June, see the memoran-
dum from Speer to Hitler, July 29, 1944, in U. s., The National Archives, 
Records .2!, ~ Reich Ministry f2!. Armaments !!!9_ £ Production (Alexand-
ria, Va., 1959), Microfilm Roll Noo 182, Item RMf RuK/1801, Frame Noso 
3394370-33943?5. (Hereafter cited as U. s., Records .2.f..~ Reich Minis-
try for Armaments and War Production .. ) See also U. s., Oil Division, Noo 
109, Fig. 15, p. 21; Wesley F. Craven, The Army~ Forces Bl World ~ 
.!!, (Chicago, 1951), III, p. 794; and Graph Nos. 2 and 3, Appendix B. 
14u. S., ~ Effects .2f Strategic Bombi~, No. 3, p .. 80. 
15u. s., Oil Division, No. 109, pp. 1, 2, 6. For bomb tonnages 
dropped, see Graph No. 2, Appendix B. 
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were diesel fuel and motor gasoline, both sorely needed by panzer di-
visions. From June 30, 1944, to March 2, 1945, the RAF bombed this plant 
eight times. Within seven days after the June 30 raid, the Germans had 
restored partial production, so the plant was hit again and again until 
it was no longer capable of producing fuelo Meerbeck was damaged almost 
beyond repair on November 20, and on March 8, 1945, the advancing Allies 
captured it.16 
The Ruhroel hydrogenation plant in the village of Bottrop in the 
Ruhr produced 14,000 tons of synthetic fuel per month, or 5.5 per cent 
of Germany's total synthetic production. Almost half of the plant's pro-
duction was aviation gasolineo Between July 20 and November 30, 1944, 
the RAF raided the plant five times and the Eighth Air Force attacked it 
on four occasionso Afte~ the first few raids the Germans were able to 
restore partial production, but by October 31 the plant was destroyed 
completelyol7 
From April until August, 1944, the Americans struck Ploesti twenty-
four times, dropping a total of 12,737 tons of bombso These attacks re-
duced Ploesti's output ninety per cent, but the effort cost the Americans 
276 heavy bombers and fifty-nine fighterso18 Thus, when the Western Al-
lies were landing in Normandy and the Russians were nearing the Vistula 
River, the Wehrmacht was deprived of its major source of natural oilo 
The loss was complete on August 22, 1944, for on that date the Russians 
16 U. s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil Division, 
Meerbeck Rheinpreussen ~ynthetic ..Q!!. Plant (2nd edo, Washington, 1947), 
I, PP• 1, 150 
17u. s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil Division, 
~hroel Rydrogenation Plant BottrQ;Q_-Boy, Germany (2nd edo, Washington, 
1947), P• lo 
18"Striking Oil," P• 370 
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captured Pl.oesti. To protect the refinery complex Hitler sent in one 
lone SS parachute battalion, but according to General Walter Warlimont, 
Deputy Chief of Operations Staff, it was never heard from again.19 
Because the Germans had only a three-month supply of fuel throughout 
most of the wa.r, the defense of the oil sources was given high priority, 
and during the first weeks of the oil offensive Allied losses were heavyo 
At first, swarms of from 200 to 600 German fighters challenged Allied 
bombers, but by July, 1944, the Luftwaffe was able to put only about 100 
fighters in action over a single sectoro 20 By early autumn, with the 
German Air Force grounded through lack of fuel, the fighter menace ceased 
to pose a major problem. 21 
Nevertheless, German anti-aircraft defense was still quite formid-
able. Deadly flak completely ringed most synthetic fuel plants and many 
of the oil refineries, and Ploesti was the third most heavily defended 
area on the continent. Besides Messerschmitt fighters, Pl.oesti had 250 
anti-aircraft guns, 2,000 smoke generators, and a host of interceptor 
nets. There were 200 anti-aircraft guns posted around the synthetic 
plant in Bruex. '!he Poelitz synthetic plant had more anti-aircraft guns 
for its defense than did the cities of Frankf'u.rt and Munich.22 
Most synthetic oil plants and natural oil refineries were easy to 
spot from the air. Some plants covered more than 100 acres, and tall 
19Wal ter Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1222,-12!±.2,, transo 
by R. He Barry (New York, 1964), Po 470. 
20Murphy, "'!he War of the Bombers," p. 225; New York Times, July 4, 
1944, Po 1. 
21 U.S., .Q!;1_ Division, Noo 109, Po 2o 
22 ~ !!!!:, Reports, P• 379; "Striking Oil," PPo 35, 37 o 
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smokestacks and numerous storage tanks aided the bomber crews in locating 
the target. The Germans erected dummy oil plants near many of their own 
installations, but Allied fiiers were only momentarily deceived. The 
vital machinery of the synthetic oil plants was surrounded by heavy con-
crete blast walls designed to absorb the shock of indirect impact of 
1,000-pound bombs. Storage tanks were often surrounded by these walls, 
and those at Ploesti were twenty feet high and two to six feet thick. In 
occupied Belgium and Holland many tanks were covered with roofs which 
made them appear as buildings when viewed from the air. 23 
Luftwaffe pilots, anti-aircraft guns, and blast walls were of no 
avail in the long run, however. As production plunged, the Wehrmacht 
and top German officials became increasingly alarmedo Before May, 1944, 
there had been no major anxiety among the Germans concerning oilo24 The 
Wehrmacht's three-month reserve supply was believed to be adequate as 
long as the refineries and synthetic plants kept producingo However, on 
May 12, the day of the first big oil raid, all complacency quickly 
vanished. Immediately after t he raid, Reichminister Speer traveled by 
airplane directly to the damaged plantso Upon surveying the destruction, 
he quickly realized the seriousness of the situationo2.5 With the oil 
sources demolished, the three- month reserve fuel supply would quickly 
23Arthur F. Holler, "German Methods of Protecting Petroleum Stocks 
During War Effective but Costly," National Petroleum ~, XXXVIII 
(March 13, 1946) , po 30; Rumpf, ~ BombiM .2! Germany, pa 170; Bayles, 
"Story Behind the Nazi Defeat," p. 91; "Striking Oil," p. 3.5. 
24rnterrogation of Dr. Butefisch, January 9, 1946, Great Britain, 
British Intell.igence Objectives Sub-Committee, Technical Information and 
Documents Unit, Synthetic .21J:_ Production !!l Germany, Interrogation of 
.!!:.• Butefisch, No. 1697 (London, 1946), p. 6. (Hereafter cited as Great 
Britain, Synthetic .Qil. Production !n Germany, No. 1697. ) 
25u. S., ~ Effects of Strategic Bombing, Noo 3, po 80. 
vanish and the German Armed Forces would be left without sufficient fuel 
for the critical winter of 1944-1945. Speer took immediate action in 
three ways: (1) an increased effort was called for in rebuilding bombed 
plants; (2) steps were taken to move synthetic oil plants underground; 
and (3) Hitler and OKWwere repeatedly warned about the developing oil 
crisis. 
Contrary to what the Allies had previously believed, the Germans 
were able to rebuild the refineries and synthetic plants much faster than 
was expected. The Joint Planning Staff of SHAEF soon realized that if 
bombing were curtailed, German oil production could be increased fifty 
per cent within one month.26 In June Speer appointed a special commis-
sioner to direct repair activities. Emergency spare parts were deposited 
near refineries and synthetic plants, and recovery plans were drawn up 
for many synthetic unitso 27 After the war, Speer testified that 350,000 
men were employed in rebuilding the synthetic oil plantso Many of these 
workers were prisoners of war and involuntary foreign laborers. Air re-
connaissance photographs showed large camps near the big synthetic plants, 
and Allied pilots observed hundreds of workers enter the damaged plant 
areas and begin repairs immediately following a raid. 28 
The experience of I.G. Farben's synthetic fuel plant at Leuna may best 
illustrate recovery progress after raids -- progress that in the long run 
proved futile. On May 12 the Allies dropped 490 tons of bombs on Leuna, 
26craven, The~ Air Forces in vk>rld War II, III, p. 795; Pogue, 
.Ih2, supreme Command, Po 308. - - -
27nstriking Oil," po 36; Bayles, "Story Behind the Nazi Defeat," Po 
92. 
28Galbraith and Ball, "Interrogation of Albert Speer," p. 58; Mlrphy, 
"The War of the Bombers," P• 255. 
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and production dropped from 50,000 tons per month to nothing. By May 28, 
when recovery was complete, 133 tons of bombs fell on the plant and it 
was completely knocked out for six days. Yet by the end of June, pro-
duction was back to tbe seventy-five per cent level, and in early July 
the Americans dropped ninety-three tons of bombs on Leuna. The plant was 
back to fifty-one per cent production by the middle of July, when yet an-
other raid followed which wiped out all productiono Recovery was back to 
thirty-five per cent by July 28. From August, 1944, to April, 1945, 
seventeen more attacks took place, and after each one the plant was par-
tially rebuilt. However, the percentage of post-attack recovery con-
tinually declined. On April 4 Leuna was at a twenty per cent normal 
production level. On that date, attack number twenty-two (and the final 
one) was carried out, and the plant never recovered.29 
Leuna, however, was an exception. Most plants did not fare as well 
and were permanently incapacitated by the end of 19440 As fall turned to 
winter it became increasingly difficult for the Germans to repair the 
plants. A favorite tactic of the Allied air forces was to wait until a 
plant had almost been repaire~ and bomb it again.30 According to General 
H. H. Arnold, 
Bomb damage nru.ltipliedo The first attack on an oil 
plant was relatively easy to repair. Subsequent bombing 
compounded the damage; pipe joints sprang leaks far from 
any bomb strike, valves failed to work, linings fell out 
of furnaces, distillation units had to be overhauled.31 
29Bayles, "Story Behind the Nazi Defeat," po 92. 
30 George Reiss, "Smashing of Refineries Seen Biggest Factor in Ger-
many's Fall," National Petroleum ~, XXXVII (October 10, 1945), p. 540 
31H. H. Arnold, "Dest ruction of Enemy Oil Plants a Lesson to be Re-
membered in Future Strategy," National Petroleum~, XXXVII (November 
21, 1945), Po 40. 
53 
As long as Allied air power remained strong, fuel production was a losing 
battle for the Germans. 
The oil attacks came with such ferocity that Speer soon realized 
that the synthetic plants could not be repaired as fast as the Allies 
could wreck them. In conjunction with the repairin~ of bombed plants, it 
was further decided to build underground synthetic units and to disperse 
several smaller plants throughout the countryside. As early as 194-0 many 
German technicians believed that the synthetic oil plants should be moved 
underground. They were informed that Germany would win the war before 
subterranean units could be constructed and were reprimanded for be-
lieving that the Reich was so vulnerable! Nevertheless, on May 31, 1944, 
Speer appointed F.dm:und Geilenberg as General Commissioner for Immediate 
Measures, with his chief assignment being the underground and dispersal 
program. He was charged by Hitler with the responsibility "for tackling 
the work turned over to him with a generous supply of manpower and ma-
terial and reckless energy. 1132 Some 120,000 laborers and a vast supply 
of equipment were assigned to Geilenberg for the underground and dis-
persal program. For the whole project, RM l,4-00,000,000 were set aside. 
Geilenberg's commission drew up plans for seven underground hydrogenation 
units, but by this time it was too late.33 In January, 1945, Speer re-
ported to Hitler that one underground synthetic oil plant was in the pro= 
cess of being constructed, but that the machinery was not yet readyo34 
32u. s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil Division, 
Underground and Dispersal Plants~ Greater Germany, Noo 112 (2nd ed., 
Washington, 1947), po lo (Hereafter cited as U. S., Underground !!:£, ~-
persal Plants, Noo 112.) 
33Bayles, "Story Behind the Nazi Defeat," po 94. 
3~orandum from Speer to Hitler, January, 1945, U. So, The Nation-
al Archives, Records .2f Headquarters, German Armed Forces High Command, 
54 
By VE day Germany had only two small underground units in operationo35 
The dispersal program fared somewhat better. In desperation, the 
Germans erected thirty-six small synthetic units in the countrysideo 
Camouflage was given top priority. The steam for each unit was provided 
by three to four captured Russian locomotive boilers. One hidden 
Fischer-Tropsch plant was located near Messinghausen, near the Ruhr, in 
a quarryo Construction on it began in September, 1944, and by November 
it was producing 2,500. tons of fuel per month. Geil enberg even built 
ten small Fischer-Tropsch units in cities near municipal gas works so 
that the carbon monoxide and hydrogen could be used in the liquefaction 
process. The Allies bombed very few of these small units, but even so, 
their total production was negligible.36 
The Germans had planned for their underground and dispersal program 
to supply them with sixty per c~nt of the January, 1944, fuel producti on 
rate, or almost 240,000 tons per month. This figure was expected to in-
crease in 1945.37 Undoubtedly, Wehrmacht operations would have fared 
Part I (Alexandria, Va., 1959), Microfilm Roll Noo 10, Item Wi/IF 5.62, 
Frame No. 721349. (Hereafter cited as U. So, Records .2f. Headquarters, 
German Armed Forces High Command , Part L ) 
35Bayles, "Story Behind the Nazi Defeat," P• 94. 
36Ibid.; GTeat Britain, British Intelligence Objectives Sub-
Committee, British Ministry of Fuel and Power, Concealed .Qi.l. Targets i!l 
the Brilon-Bredelar Area, No. 39 (London, 1945), p. 1. 
- -
37u. s., Underground~ Dispersal Plants, No. 112, p. 1 . Speer, 
in a January, 1945, memorandum to Hitler, stated that planned fuel pro-
duction for October, November, and December, 1944, was 221,000 tons , 
249,000 tons, and 284,000 tons respectively. Speer must have realized 
that the underground program was not materializing as planned, for be-
ginning in 1945, his figures for planned fuel production were revised 
downward: January-154,000 tons, February-188,000 tons, and March-
241,000 tons. See U. s., Records 2£. Headquarters , German Armed Forces 
High Command, Part I , Microfilm Roll No. 10~ Item Wl/IF 5.g2, Frame Nos. 
721348-721351. 
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much better in late 1944 and early 1945 if this production had been 
available. 
Between June and December, 1944, Speer sent twelve memoranda to 
Hi tJ.er and OKW informing them of the catastrophic bombing attacks on the 
oil industry.38 Speer was not only aware of the plunging oil production, 
but also acutely conscious of the consequences in store for the Wehrmacht 
and Germany if production continued to fall. On June 30 Speer informed 
the Fuehrer that because of the Allied air raids, production for June 
had fallen far short of the planned amount. Furthermore, Speer correctly 
predicted that the situation would worsen in July)9 The air strikes 
continued to destroy production, and Wehrmacht operations increased in 
intensity, thereby making it necessary for critical reserves to be used 
up. Already in July the German Am.y and Air Force were furiously fight-
ing the Red Army in eastern Poland and trying desperately to keep the 
V'kstern Allies penned up in Normandy. As a result, during July the Armed 
Forces consumed almost 400,000 tons of fuel, but production for that 
month was only 147,000 tons. Since May, consumption had exceeded pro-
duction, and the extra amount had to come from the Wehrmacht's fuel re-
serve. On May 12 the reserve amounted to 1,372,000 tons, but by July 31 
it had plunged to 800,000 tons and continued to fallo 40 
On July 28, 1944, when the Russians had reached the Vistula, Speer 
assured HitJ.er that German armament production could match that of the 
38 
~' XVI, PPo 484-4850 
39Memorandum from Speer to HitJ.er, June 30, 1944, U. s., Records .2£. 
the Reich Ministk7 for Armament s and War Production, Microfi lm Roll Noo 
182, Item RMf RuK 1801, Fr ame Noo 33943bL 
40 
See Graph No. 3, Appendix Be 
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Russians .. The Armed Forces were well equipped with tanks and airplanes, 
Speer argued, but if the Allied oil ottensive continued, then the Army 
and_wf'twatre would be in grave trouble on.the Eastern Fronto4l As the 
summer turned to fall, Speer's conmru.nications to Hitler and OKW became 
more al.armingo 'Ibey seemed, however, to have little effecto On Septem ... 
ber 30, l9Li4, Field Marshal Keitel informed Speer that the. Fuehrer was 
aware of the tuel situation, but that Wehrmacht operations were going to 
continue on all tronts.42 Speer was not dismayed. Unlike many or the 
men closest to Hitler, Speer never al.terea tacts to make a worsening 
situation look better .. Early in October, Speer informed the Fuehrer that 
-German troops on the Western Front were well supplied with armored ve-
hicles, arms, and ammunition, but there remained only one problem.: un, ..... 
less the enemy were prevented from bombing German oil sources, Wehrmacht 
operations in the West must soon come to a halt .. 4'.'3 
How accurate were Speer0s warnings? At exactly what point was the 
effectiveness·· or the German Armed Forces seriously jeopardized because 
or the Allied air offensive on oil? Mu.ch can be learned from Speer's 
memoranda to Hitler and OKW, but Wehrmacht operations and reaction to 
the oil shortage can better answer the question. 
Local shortages were certainly nothing new long before 1944. As 
early as the spring or 1942 horse~drawn artillery and wagons had been 
41Memorandum from Speer to Hitler, July 28, 1944, u. s., Records g!, 
Headquarters, German Armed Forces High Command, Part I, Microfilm Roll 
No .. 10, Item. Wi/r, 5.60, Frame No. 721295. 
42Tele~ram trom Keitel to Speer, September 30, 1944, Uo So, Records 
g!, Headquarters, German Armed Forces High.Command, Part II, Microfilm 
Roll No. 528, Item Wi/I, 172a, Frame No. 17001590 . 
43nrart memorandum from Speer to Hitler, Germ.any, October 4, 1944, 
u .. s .. , Records of Headquarters, German Armed Forces High Command, Part 
I, Item Wi/IF 5:'bl, Frame Noo 7213li4o 
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pressed into service on the Russian Front. Much of Montgomery's success 
at El Alamein in November, 1942, was due to the fact that many of Rommel's 
panzers had exhausted their fuel, making excellent s~ationary targets for 
RAF fighters.44 But until May, 1944, Wehrmacht fuel difficulties were 
not caused by a general shortage at the frontso There was still a reserve 
and production was increasing. Early fuel problems on the Ea.stern Front 
were local in nature and due to transportation problems. Russian par-
tisans behind German lines were most active, with fuel trains being a top 
prize. As for Rommel, much of the fuel destined for bis Afrika Corps 
was sunk in the Mediterranean by the British.45 
Because of i t s three-month reserve supply, the Armed Forces never 
experienced an overall strategic shortage of fuel before the oil offen-
sive begano Production until May, 1944, was adequate, the German Army 
and Air Force had enough fuel for immediate needs, and any shortages were 
due mainly to transportation problems. Furthermore, because of the Ger-
man Armed Forces• far- flung operations, it is most difficult to give a 
precise date after May, 1944, as to when a strategic shortage of fuel be-
gan to affect combat acti vit y at the frontso Even the head of the~ 
schaftsgruppe Kraftstoffe, a state cont rolled cartel of oil companies 
distributing fuel to t he Wehrmacht, was unable to say exactly when a 
general oil shortage was felto46 It is possible, however, to be spe~ 
cific within one or two monthso 
44"Germany at War; 'lh.e Oil Problemj" The Economist, CXLV (July 3, 
1943), p. 18; Snyder, ~ ~, ! Concise History, J:2J.2.-!2!±2., p. 281.. 
45Erwin Rommel, !h2, Rommel Papers, trans. by Paul Findlay (New York, 
1953), p. 280. 
46Interrogation of Dr. B.ltefisch, January 9, 1946, Great Britain, 
Synthetic Oil Production in Germany, No. 1697, p. 6. 
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Considerabl~ evid,ence suggests that the fuel situation became ori ti-
cal for the Armed Forces at the ti~ of the Normandy invasion, or im-
mediately thereafter. According to General Omar Bradley, by June, 19"'4, 
the "enemy was desperately hoarding his gas • .,47 Not only was the Wehr-
macht hoarding gasoline, bttt they began to experience serious fuel prob-
lems the minute the Allies stormed ashore at Normandy, as the records 
show. The Allied blow fell upon the German Seventh Army which was quick-
ly reinforced with five of von Rundstedt's strategic reserve panzer di-
visions scattered throughout France and Belgium. By June 10 German 
Seventh Army units were experienc~ng fuel problems. General Eu.gene 
Meindl, commander of the 2nd Parachute Corps, stationed near Brest in 
Bri~,reported on June 10 that his 3rd Parachute Division ''mu.st be 
brought up piecemeal owing to the shortage of fuel •••• One regiment 
is east of St .. '!$ but the main body is still in Brittany • ..48 At noon 
on June 10 the 17th SS Panzer l)i.vision, moving up from the Loire region, 
reported to Seventh A:rmy Headquarters that "leading units of 17th SS are 
stuck in the St. Lo'area because of the lack of ruei • ..49 It took the 2nd 
SS Panzer Division two weeks to travel the 450 miles from Toulouse to the 
Normandy Front .... the reason being a need for fuel. Even as early as the 
evening of June 6 the 12th SS Panzer Division was delayed in counter-
attacking the British because of a lack of rue1.,50 Captured German pa)lZer 
troops at Normandy said that many orders for counterattacks were never 
47 Omar N. Bradley,! Soldier's Stoty; (New York, 1951), Po 245. 
48Wilmot, lb.! Struggle .!.2.£ Ellrope, P• 306. 
49rud. 
50 Ibid., PP• 296, 305-306. 
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carried out because needed fuel never arrivedo51 
The Wehrmac.ht was hoarding gasoline in June because of the strategic 
bombing raids on German production facilitieso Bat the Army's fuel 
shortages in June at Normandy were not at that date due to an overall 
strategic shortageo The Wehrmacht still had a 1,000,000 ton reserveo52 
Instead, the panzer divisions 9 problems can be attributed to the over-
whelming superiority of the Allied tactical air forces (io eo, planes in 
/ 
direct support of the army units) operating at Normandyo It was a problem 
of transportation, and not an overall strategic shortageo 
Post-war testimony by members of Rundstedt0 s staff further empha-
sized the tactical nature of these shortages immediately following D-Dayo 
In order to lessen fuel losses to Allied tactical aircraft, the Germans 
reduced their haulage from approximately 700 tons to 300 tons per fuel 
train. Oil cars were camouflaged as box cars, and much railroad move ... 
ment was restricted to the hours of darknesso53 Still, fuel losses 
during transport were extremely heavyo54 
For example, on June 5, the Panzer Lehr Division,) commanded by 
General Fritz Bayerleln, was ordered to move at 5 P0Mo Panzer Lehr was 
stationed at Chateaudun, 130 miles fr<llm the Normandy Front., Bayerlein 
asked to wait until dark to move, but his request was denied., As a re= 
sult be~ween 5 PoM. and dark he lost almost thirty vehicles from air at-
tacks. On June 7, between Chateau.dun and Normandy, the Allied air 
51Murphy, "The War of the Bombers," Po 255; Gordon, "After D Day, 11 
p. 6. 
52see Graph Noo 3, Appendix Bo 
53rnterroga.tion of von Rundstedt0 s staff' officers, June 12, 1945, 
Uo s., Headquarters Army Air Forces, Office of the Assistant Chief of 
Air Staff, Defeat (Washington, 1946), po 240 (Hereafter cited as U. s., 
Defeat.,) 
.54New York Times, July 17, 1944, po Bo 
60 
forces destroyed forty of Bayerleines fuel transport truckso55 
As the summer drew out, the Allied tactical air forces found fewer 
fuel targetso The strategic air forces were simply drying up the i'u.el 
supply behind the frontso It was at this point that gasoline became 
critically scarceo According to von Rundstedt, fuel allocations for the 
Western Front were sufficient up to July, 1944, but then in August OKW 
began lowering allocations, and by October, reductions came almost 
daily.56 General Hans Speidel, Rommel's Chief of Staff, readily agreed 
with von Rundstedt's observations of the fuel situation,57 and General 
Arnold claimed that a strategic fuel drought began to take effect as 
early as July.58 Thus, from the late summer of 1944 on, the Wehrmacht 
was not only faced with collapsing fronts, but the danger to Germany was 
compounded by a critical shortage of fuelo 
The Luftwaffe felt the effects of the fuel shortage firsto Not 
only was it unable to halt the Allied attacks on fuel production, but its 
excessive fuel consumption in these futile efforts reduced the supply 
still further, thus reducing the scope of aerial defense even more. As 
a result more enemy planes got through, more bombs were dropped, pro-
duction declined, and Luftwaffe storage tanks had no means of being re-
filledo59 The demise of the Germ.an Air Foree was nearo 
55Sa:muel w. Taylor, "As a German General Saw It," Th§. ,Saturday;, 
!!Jvening Post, CCXVIII (October 20, 1945), ppo 15, 500 See a1so Wilmot, 
l'h! Struggle !.2!: Europe, p .. 300, for an account of the interrogation of 
Baylerlein by the U.S. Seventh A:rm.y. 
56Interrogation of von Rundstedt, May 10 and 12, 1945, U. Se, Q!!. 
Division, No., 109, p& 390 
57Hans Speidel, ~ .!k3fended No:rm.a,n_g;z,, trans .. by Ian Colvin (London9 
1951), p .. 148 .. 
58New York Times, July 4, 1944t po lo 
59u. S .. , 23:! Di vision, No., 109, Po 2 .. 
61 
In August, 1944, the Luftwaffe shortened the previous two-hour run-
in time for new aircraft engines to one-half hour. M:>reover, by this 
I 
time new airplanes were often moved to the fronts by rail, and twin en-
gine fighter-bomber training had oeased. 60 Air Force fighters were the 
only effective air arm left, and their days were numbered. The Chief of 
Staff of the I.uftwaffe in Italy later lamented that: 
The GAF ( German Air Force) program was very mu.oh 
handicapped by the scarcity of fuel. Our aircraft were 
often grounded because there was not enough fuel avail-
able to continue the training of pilots. 
Almost daily we phoned Berlin and requested RLM to 
send fuel. We alwalf received the same reply: 'The 
bottJ.es are empty.• 
By September OKW had discontinued virtually all Inftwaffe training. The 
few pilots trained thereafter were sent into combat with only forty to 
forty-five hours of actual fiying time. They were no match for the 
skilled British and American pilots. Toward the month's end, most of 
the German Air Force was grounded for lack of fuel. 62 Ironically, SeP-
tember, 1944, was the peak month of the war for fighter production. As 
General Arnold put it, "The Iuftwaffe has lots of planes -- but no 
gas.n63 
After September the Luftwaffe was a nullity, and the Army bore the 
sole responsibility for protecting Germany with only a scattering of 
60 
"U. s. Strategic Bombi ng Survey Shows How Nazi La.ck of Oil Hasten-
ed Their Defeat," National Petroleum News, XXXVII ( November 7, 1945), p . 
62; Wl.adyslaw Anders, H:itJ.er's Defeat~Russia (Chicago, 1953), p. 228; 
Murphy, "The var of the Bombers," p. 255. 
61 U. s., Defeat, p. 34. 
62charles V. P. von Inttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the 
Ardennes," in Command Decisions, ed. by Kent Roberts Greenfield (rm.shing-
ton, 196o), p. 447; U. s. , .Q!l Division, No. 109, p. 2; "Striking Oil," 
P• 37. 
63New York Times, October 1, 1944, p. 3. 
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fighter support • .All remaining f'uel production went to the Army, but this 
was never sufficient f'or its needs. By September it was under the threat 
of' being immobilized for a lack of f'ue1. 64 Already crude and inefficient 
expedients had been applied to the problem of' mobility. During the sum-
mer the 26th Panzer Division Headquarters in Italy issued the following 
wi:thdrawal order to its panzer units: 
Armored units which are not completely ready for action 
and those which cannot be taken along on account Of' the fuel 
position must be blown up. Commanders will have to decide 
which motor transport will have to be taken along and which 
lert behind, basing their decision on the f'uel position.65 
By the middle of July Germa.n forces in the St. 18· area of Normandy were 
using one truck or tank to tow two or three combat or supply vehicles. 
; 
In August, when the German Army began retreating from France, they care-
fully took every last can of gasoline with them. German officers began 
warning their troops to be extremely cautious in f'uE¥, econom:y,66 and by 
October von Rundstedt was calling for gas generators for panzers, and re-
quiring all trucks in his command t~ pull trailers. 67 Tanks and other 
armored.vehicles were often moved into attack position by oxen. Com-
manding generals had to approve all trips exceeding sixty miles, and a 
:maximum speed of seventeen miles per hour was placed on all armored ve-
hicle movements.68 
64von Luttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," p. 
447. 
65"Striking Oil," P• 36. 
66"Is Germany Cracldng: Shortages of Vi ta.1 Raw Materials That Can 
Bring Early Collapse," Uo So News, November 10, 1944, p. 24; New York 
_Times, July 17, 1944, p"'; 8; Murphy, "The War of the Bombers," p. 255. 
67rnterrogation of' von Rundstedt, May 10 and 12, 1945, u. s., .9il, 
Division, No. 109, P• 39. 
68 Ibid., p. 2. 
The Wehrmacht's fuel crisis, however, seemed to have little effect 
on Hitler's planning in the fall of 1944. Although most of the Luftwaffe 
was inoperative, the Army almost immobilized, and all fronts were on the . 
verge of collapse, the Fuehrer, nevertheless, set in motion the last 
great German offensive of the war, a final thrust through the Ardennes .. 
It successful, it would literally rip the Western Allies apart; if it 
failed, the death of the Third Reich was near. It was indeed a desper-
ate gamble. 
CHAPTER IV 
GERMAN ARMY OPERATIONS IN THE ARDENNES, DEx:!EMBER, 1944-JANUARY, 
1945 
Hitler believed that a major German offensive in the West in Decem-
ber, 1944, offered a final chance to prevent complete defeat of his 
forces. After so many tragic reverses since Stalingrad, the thought of 
taking the offensive again filled the Fuehrer with enthusiasm. One would 
have supposed that while the iron jaws of the Allies were closing in on 
Germany during September and October, OKWwould be conserving men and 
materiel for the final defense of the fatherland. Yet, on the contrary, 
Hitler concentrated almost all his efforts on the proposed winter offen-
sive. When one considers the ambitious objectives of this offensive and 
the limited means for their attainment, the scheme seems bold indeed. 
Failure of the counteroffensive would mean rapid exhaustion and collapse. 
During the latter half of 1944 the main German strategy centered on 
holding the Russians off in the East and throwing back the Allied in-
vasion in the West. This was necessary in order for Germany to avoid a 
crushing synchronized blow from both fronts.I If the Western Allies 
could be dealt a severe blow in the Ardennes, Hitler believed that this 
:would "change the course of the campaign in the West and perhaps of the 
entire war."2 Underestimating the strength and resolution of the Western 
1Eliot , 11The German Army Today: Numbers, Disposition, M:>rale," p. 
520; F.dgar Mcinnis, ~ War; Sixth Year (Toronto, 1946), p. 39. 
2warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, ~-~, p. 482. 
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Allies, Hitler reasoned that if the British and the .Americans ~re dealt 
a stunning blow, it would cripple and possibly shatter the Western Al-
liance. The Western Powers would then abandon their demand for uncon-
ditional surrender, realize the impossibility of crushing Germany, and 
negotiate a compromise peace.,3 Then Hitler could hurl his armies 
against the'Russianso 
The Fuehrer further reasoned that even if the Western Allies would 
not agree tc>. a negotiated peace, such a victory in the .Ardennes would 
alter the course of the war ~y giving him time., w.tth the American and 
British plans for a quick winter thl"IJ.st into Germany fl"llstrated, Hitler 
could rebuild Gemany11 s bombed industry, including the wrecked synthet-
ic oil plants, under the cover or winter :weather. All-out production of 
the ne~ jet fighters, V-wea.pons, and electro-U-boats could then begin. 4 
Exactly what would the German Artrr:I' have to accomplish in order to 
reverse the p~rilous situation on the Westem Front? Such a strategic 
victory a.s a compromise peace or the winning or more time would require 
a bold tactical success. Hitler's tactical objective5 was the great Al-
lied port or Antwerp!P'and the ann:ihiliation or almost one half of the Al-
. lied divisions in the West. The Fuehrer expected German Army Group B, 
comm.anded by Field Marshal Waelter Model, to jump ott from the Siegfried 
Line in the Eitel Forest, p11sh rapidly through the Ardennes, cross the 
Meuse River, and wheel northwest for Antwerp. This was to take fourteen 
3 Wilmot, Ib!. Struggle !2,t Eu.rope, P• "560. 
4 Ibid.; Guderian, Panzer Leader, P• '.3800 
5The Ardennes counteroffensive has of'ten been called the "Rundstedt 
Offensive~" This is an erroneous term, tor it was HitJ.er himself who 
conceived it, carried out the major portion or its planning, anc, e:x:e?>= 
c:ised c»verall·eiie»ntr._~l-c»nc® it begano 
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days. Once Antwerp and its vast store of Allied supplies had been caP-
tured, Army 01-oup B would then turn northeast and destroy almost thirty 
American, British, and Canadian divisions in northern Belgium and 
southern Holland. In conjunction w.i th Model• s attack, Army 01-oup H, to 
be positioned no;th of Aachen and Cologne, would strike west through 
-southern Holland and aid Arm.y Group Bin its northeasterly path of an-
6 
nihilation. With the loss of Antwerp and one-half of the Western Allied 
divisions, .the Western Powers would be forced to come to terms or be 
paralyzed for a considerable length of time. Anticipating the possi-
bility of such a str~tegic success, the Fuehrer was willing to acc~pt 
the maximum risk that such a venture entailed.? 
A tactical objective like Antwerp, which was by December 130 miles 
inside the Allied lines, required much forethought and planning on the 
part of Hitler and OKW. The thought of going over to the offensive, 
after so many reversals since the Normandy landings, the Russian summer 
offensive, and the Allied oil offensive, came to Hitler himself as early 
as August, 1944. General Alfred Jodl, Chief of OKW Operations Staff, 
confided to his diary on August 19, 1944: 
The Fuhrer discussed the equipment and manpower position in 
the ~st with Chief of OKW, Chief Army Staff, and Speer. 
Prepare to~ 1:h2. offensive in November when the enemy air 
6 Von luttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," PP• 
452, 455; Guenther filumentritt, "Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Own 
Story of the Batt.le of the ful.ge," Collier's, CXX:XI (January 3, 1953), 
p. 16; Wilmot, ~ Struggle f2t Europe, p. 545. One of OKW' s maps pre-
pared before the offensive began which shows planned German objectives, 
is in U. s., The National Archives, Records of German Field Commands, 
Arm.*4/4oups, . Part I (Alexandria, Va., 1964),Microfilm Roll No. 18, Item 
751 a-f, Frame No. 7020184. (Hereafter cited as U. s., Records of 
German Field Commands, !rn 01-oups, Part I.) See also Map No. 3, AP--
pendix A. 
7Warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1222-~, p. 482. 
forces can't operate. Main point: some~ divisions~ 
be moved to the West in the next one to two months.8 
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Originally, the Fuehrer contemplated a sinmltaneous offensive against the 
Russians on the :Eastern Front. Then, with the Red Army reeling back, 
HitJ.er believed that he could strike in the West. This idea, however, 
was quickly shelved, as the Western Allies were approaching the Siegfried 
Line faster than expected, and probably more importan~ly, the Fuehrer and 
OKW realized that the Wehrmacht did not have the necessary gasoline to 
support a sufficientJ.y deep penetration of Russian territory.9 
By September all thought of a major offensive in the :East was for-
gotten, as plans rapidly began to materialize for offensive operations on 
the Western Front. :Early in October, Hi tJ.er and OKW concluded that the 
best place for a breakthrough in the West would be in the Ardennes on an 
eighty-five mile front between F.chternach, Inxembourg, and Monschau, 
Germany. _'!hereafter activity was stepped up, and final overall plans 
were completed on October 9. General Jodl did much of the staff work, 
but HitJ.er was a.lways nearby to alter10 or expand the preparations. '!he 
final plans left OKW on October 22. On this day Generals Westphal and 
Krebs were directed to begin implementing the plans for the offensiveo 
HitJ.er told them that November 20 was the final date for the completion 
8Ibid., p. 457. Hugh M. Cole, The Ardennes, and Charles V. P. von 
Luttichau, "'!he German Counteroffens!v'; in the Ardennes," both claim that 
Hitler did not announce his decision for a counteroffensive in the West 
until September 16. They base their belief on the diary of General Wer-
ner Kreipe, Chief of Staff of the I.nftwaffe, who often represented Goer-
ing at the Fuehrer conferences. Warlimont, however, is the better 
source, and August is the more accurate date. Warlimont was Jodl's depu-
ty until September, 1944. 
9von Luttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," p. 
452; Wilmot,~ struggle f2.!: &trope, p. 560. 
lOwarlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 12:i2,-~, pp. 480-481. 
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of all preparations, and that the attack would begin on November 25.ll 
Westphal and Krebs, upon returning to their respective headquarters 
on the Western Front, and in conjunction with Field Marshals von Rundstedt 
and M::>del, began work immediately. Both field marshals, however, saw 
many naws i .n the proposed operation. They were quick to advance to Hit-
ler an alternative "limited solution." Von Rundstedt conceded that the 
whole operational idea was superior, but that the German Army was unlike-
ly to reach such an ambitious goal as Antwerp. It simply did not have 
the means to do so. The "limited solution" of von Rundstedt and Model 
was to attempt to destroy the Allied units east of the Meuse River, and 
eliminate the Aachen salient which the American First Army had won in 
October.12 At Aachen the West Wall had been breached and this was no 
small worry to von Rundstedt. Both field marshals continued their pro-
testing and suggesting throughout November, but it was to no avail. On 
November 25, OKW sent them a final "no:" "The Fuehrer ••• is unalter-
ably decided on the objective and scope of the attack ••• he is totally 
opposed ••• to the idea of a 'limited solution.,.,13 
But the end of November came and went without a German attack. 
Several factors caused the delay. Generally, the Germans were holding 
the Siegfried Line solidly, but General Patton in the Metz sector and 
General Hodges in the Aachen salient were pinning down German divisions 
needed for the offensive. Many of the new Volksgrenadier divisions being 
trained for the offensive were not ready by the end of November and had 
11 Cole, ~ Ardennes, p. 22. 
12Testimony of von Rundstedt, August 12, 1946, ~' XXI, P• 29. 
See also Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 380. 
13warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, !2J.2.-~, P• 483. 
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not yet moved up to the assembly area in the Eifel Forest. With the 
coming of December an even more ominous situation began to cause delay: 
a shortage of fuel. Armored and mechanized divisions moving up to the 
front had consumed much more gasoline than was expected. This caused a 
delay, as the depleted fuel tanks in the Eifel had to be refilled.14 This 
was a serious portent of worse things to come. 
Ill.ring the first week in December, Hitler moved his headquarters 
from Rastenburg to Ziegenberg, about thirty miles north of Frank:f'urt. By 
then many of the German divisions were in place and ready. Bad weather 
kept Allied reconnaissance planes grounded and the troop buildup went un-
observed. On December 12 all army, corps, and division commanders taking 
part in the attack were informed or the real nature of the concentration 
or troops in the Eifel east of the Ardennes. That night they were order-
ed to von Iblndstedt's headquarters near Ziegenberg, relieved of their 
sidearms and briefcases, and then driven to Hitler's command bunker. 
Once inside, they were subjected to a two-hour harangue on German history, 
and a pronouncement that the hour had finally come to regain the initia-
tive in the West. When told of the impending offensive, the generals 
were astonis~ed but offere~ no objections. The repercussions of the plot 
on Hitler•.s life were still fresh in their minds.15 By December 15, all 
was ready. At midnight on that date, OB West's War Diary entry read: 
"Tomorrow brings the beginning of a new chapter in the campaign in the 
West • ..16 
14 Cole, The Ardennes, p. 63. 
15Wilmot, ~ Struggle f2!. Ellrope, pp. 577-579; Guderian, Panzer 
Leader, p. 379. 
16 Cole, ~ Ardennes, p. 74. 
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Did Hitler have the resources for an offensive of this scope? There 
appeared to be enough men and materiel. Model had 250,000 troops, and 
their morale was excellent. They were grouped in the Sixth SS Panzer 
Army under General Sepp Dietrich, the Fifth Panzer Anny under General 
Hasso von Manteuffel, and the Seventh German Army commanded by General 
Erich Brandenberger. These three armies as a whole contained seven crack 
panzer divisions and thirteen infantry divisions. Five OKW reserve di-
visions were to follow up immediately.17 Arm.y Group B comprised 1,420 
tanks and assault guns, most of which were the new Panthers and Tigers. 
Two-thousand pieces of artillery were available, and all troops had an 
adequate supply of ammunition.18 
'!he element of surprise, concentration of force, and weather were 
on Hitler's side. Between Monschau and Echternach only four American 
First Anny divisions faced the powerful Army Group B. Along a forty 
mile line north of Monschau were sixteen divisions of the First and Ninth 
American Armies. They were preparing for an attack out of the Aachen 
salient and into Germany itself. On a sixty mile front south of the 
Ardennes, ten divisions of the American Third Army were poised and ready 
to strike in the Saar. The American command believed the Germans in-
capable of launching a major offensive, least of all in the Ardennes. 
On December 16 they were to realize their mistake. Hitler needed ten 
days of overcast weather to keep the Allied tactical air forces grounded. 
German meteorologists worked with OKW and the required weather was 
l7 ' d ' Own Sto f th mumentritt, "Field Marshall von Rundste ts ry o e 
Battle of the Bulge," Po 18; Cole, ~ Ardennes, P• ?1. 
18John Toland, Battle; The Sto;ry 2!.. ~ Bulge (New York, 1959), PP• 
21-22; Cole,~ Ardennes, p. 71. 
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promised Hitler. It was to begin in the middle of December.19 
On paper, the tactical situation appeared excellent. The Sixth SS 
Panzer Army on the right was to attack through Monschau, drive northwest, 
cross the Meuse on both sides of Liege, and wheel on to Antwerp. In the 
center of Arrrry Group B was the Fifth Panzer Army. This force was to 
complement the attack of the Sixth SS by smashing through Bastogne, 
crossing the Meuse between Huy and Di.nant, and then driving toward Ant-
werp. The Seventh Army, on the left, was to run out a string of infantry 
divisions from Luxembourg City to Givet and prevent the Third American 
Arm.y from attaclq.ng the south flank of Fifth Panzer. 20 The plan almost 
worked. 
Clearly, most of the means and conditions that Hitler needed for his 
offensive had been realized by early December. There was, however, one 
important exception: gasoline supply, a crucial logistics problem for 
any mechanized arm.ad force and especially for Arm.y Group B in December··, 
1944. The Allied oil offensive was to have disastrous effects on this 
newly formed Arrrry Group and later on all fronts, especially in the F.ast. 
Probably Hitler's greatest error in planning and executing the Ardennes 
attack was his failure and unwillingness to recognize the fact that he 
simply did not have sufficient gasoline to gain his objec.tives. General 
Fritz Bayerlein, commander of the Panzer Lehr Di.vision, later recounted 
how Hitler, in his two hour harangue at Ziegenberg on December 12, had 
promised the gener.als sufficient fuel to reach Antwerp. But not one 
19 Wilmot, .!h2, Struggle f2!.. Ellrope, p. 580; Blumentritt, "Field 
Marshal von Rundstedt's Own Story of the Battle of the Bulge," p. 20; 
Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 380. 
20 See Map No. 3, Appendix A. 
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general present believed him.21 The Fuehrer even spoke in terms of 
enough fuel for Ar.my Group B to drive 300 miles, which would have taken 
them well beyond Antwerp.22 He was not the only person at OKW guilty of 
abSllrd promises. According to General von Manteuffel: "Jodl had as-
Sllred us there would be S11fficient petrol to develop our full strength 
and carry our drive through. This asS11rance proved completely mis-
ta.ken."23 
In considering fuel planning, Keitel was probably the only high-
ranking offic~r in OKW who did not indulge in irrational promises. On 
October 22, when Generals Westphal and Krebs were at Rastenburg, Keitel 
"gave his word as an officer /Jo Westphal and 'Krebif' that 17 ,OOO cubic 
meters (4,250,000 gallons) of motor fuel would be available for the at-
tack. ••24 The Chief of OKW kept his word. By December 15 OKW had 
managed to supply Army Group B with the promised 4,250,000 ga1lons of 
f'uel. 25 Most of this gasoline ~s brought up to the Eifel assembly area 
by rail, proving that German trains were still operating. 
How was Keitel able to scrape up some 17,000 cubic meters or fuel 
for one army group when in Oct,ober the whole Wehrm.acht was practica11y 
'' 
21Milton Shulman, Defeat in the West (New York, 1948), p. 231; Wil-
mot, ~ Struggle !2,t Fhrope, p. 578.-
22l'h!, !!!!: Reports .2! General ~ !b.! !£m George £.:. Marshall, General 
.2!, ~ Ar.mz l!· H. Arnold, !m! Fleet Admira1 Ernest .!• King, p. 425; Wil-
mot, .Ih!!, Struggfe !2,t Europe, p. 600; Samuel w. Taylor, ''As a German 
Genera1 Saw It," ,lh! Saturdaz Evening~, CCXVIII (October 20, 1945), 
p. 54. 
23B. H. Liddell-Hart, Ih!, German Genera1s l!l.!s. (New York, 1948), p .. 
278. 
24eo1e, Ih! Ardennes, p. 22. Von Luttichau, in "The Ger.man Counter-
offensive in the Ardennes," p. 457, a1so claims that 4,000,000 gallons 
were promised. l?,000 cubic meters is equivalent to 12,000 metric tons. 
25J3lumentritt, "Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Own Story of the 
Battle of the Bll.ge," p. 19; Cole, .I!!!!. Ardennes, pp. 68, 666. 
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paralyzed for lack of gasoline? On August 30 Speer had warned Hitler 
that in view of the desperate fuel situation, the Wehrm.acht would be in-
operative by October or November. But now in December, the Fuehrer had 
enough fuel to at least begin a big offensive. According to Speer, this 
was rendered possible because the Allies had been held stationary on all 
fronts since September, and the German Army was able to reduce its over-
all fuel consumption. 26 This, however, was only part of the reason. 
Since August, OKW had been hoarding fuel and denying the precious liquid 
to armies on other fronts -- all for the last big push in the West. This 
action was to result in serious consequences for the German Army at the 
beginning of 1945, especially in the East. Because the already inadequate 
allotments of gasoline were taken from the German armies on the Eastern 
Front, the German forces there would soon find themselves uriable to 
maneuver against the impending Russian offensive. 27 Jodl's diary entries 
illustrate not only serious concern for fuel, but also where much of it 
came from: 
10 November: ••• Three thousand tons (7fue17 transport 
capacity) ••• at the moment not guaranteed from Italy 
or Army Group North (the F.ast). 
8 December: 7,150 cubic metres fuel available; a further 
6,000 on the way together with 2,400 from the F.ast. The 
remainder must come from production and must be moved up 
urgently.28 
Thus, in October and November the Western Front, and in particular 
Army Group B, became the recipient for most of Germany's now insufficient 
fuel production. Fu.el conservation became an 1 tern of top priority. OKW 
26Testimony of Albert Speer, June 20, 1946, ~, XVI, p. 486. 
27von I.nttichau, "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes," pp. 
447-448. 
28warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headguarters, ~-!.2!!:2., P• 483. 
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continually reminded the commander of OB West, von Rundstedt, of the need 
for stringent fuel measures, and the old field marshal issued his own 
warnings. On December 7, OKW informed von Rundstedt of the serious air 
attacks on the oil industry and that squandering of gasoline through 
thoughtless motorized movements was strictly forbidden. 29 It was not an 
easy and inexpensive task for the German Army to hold the Allies on the 
Siegfried Line. Not only were men and materiel expended, but so was 
gasoline. Even on the defense the German Army had to be mobil. Von 
Rundstedt was therefore having trouble in maintaining his new allowances 
of gasoline. After OKW had reminded von Rundstedt of what he already 
knew, he then issued his own warning to Army Group B. On December 10 the 
field marshal demanded that his subordinate commands be extremely cautious 
in their consumption of fuel.JO 
Germany's fuel drought hindered the training of those units that 
were to be engaged in the Ardennes strike. The Panzer Lehr Division, 
having been badly mauled at Normandy, had been withdrawn to Paderborn 
where it was being refitted and retrained for the Ardennes. Its com-
mander, General Ba.yerlein, claimed that by September, fuel was so scarce 
that only blackboard maneuvers could be carried out. The resourceful 
Ba.yerlein took action on his own. As he later admitted: "I got no fuel 
at all for training -- legally. To get my division ready, I wangled 
fuel by personal connections ... 31 Before the attack there was undoubtedly 
29 Letter from OKW to Rundstedt, December 7, 1944, U. S. , Records .2!, 
German Field Commands, Army Groups, Part I, Microfilm Roll No. 18, Item 
75144/40 a-f, Frame Nos. 7020621., 7020622. 
30tetter from von Rundstedt to subordinate commands, December 10, 
1944, Ibid., Frame No. 7020623. 
31·Taylor, "As a German General Saw It," p. 54. 
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much ''wangling" of fuel 9 includi ng t he theft of gasoline by one unit from 
another within OB Westo On December 1 General Westphal of OB West com ... 
plained to General Krebs of Army Group B about the theft of 2,500 cubic 
meters of fuel from OB West 0 s reserveso Westphal stated that it was not 
possible to replace this amount until December 15, and that some 10,500 
cubic meters of fuel had been ordered on November 30, but the delivery of 
it was unlikely)2 
Fuel was so valuable that OKW had t o carry out conservation measures 
right down to the final moment preceding the attacko The new Panther and 
Tiger tanks rolled off the assembly lines and were immediately hauled to 
the E:lfel assembly area by railo There was not even sufficient gasoline 
to run in the new panzer engineso To conserve fuel, many of the vehicles 
in Model's divisions were moved up to the Eitel by rail on the night of 
December 150 In many cases ammunition was carried up by hand, and often= 
times horses were employed in t owing vehicles into their final attack po= 
sitionso 33 Not a drop of the hard-won 4,250,000 gallons was to be used 
unnecessarily. 
Because of Army Group B0 s critical demands for fuel~ pr3=at tack oom-
' bat operations were jeopardized. For example, Operation Hohes ~, of 
critical importance, proved a miserable failure for this reasono This 
mission, commanded by Colonel Friedrich von der Heydte, was under opera= 
t:1.onal control of Dietrich0 s Sixth SS Panzer Arm.yo General Dietrich 
32 Letter from Westphal to Krebs, December 1, 1944, Uo So, Records 
2!, German Field Commands, Amz Groups, Part I, Microfilm Roll Noo 18, 
Item 75144/46 a=f, Frame Noo 70204590 
. ' 
33W:tlmot, .!h! Struggle !2,t Fllrope, Po 609; Taylor9 "As a GeI"!IWl 
General Saw It9 " po 55; Toland, BatUe: -lb! Story .2! the Bulge 9 po 21~ 
Charles Go Bolte, "Countel"offensive," l'1l! Nation, CLI'xtDecember 30, 
1944)1,1 Po ?90o 
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directed von der Heydte and his 1,000 paratroopers to carry out a night 
drop on December 15-16 in the Hohes Venn area north of Malmedy. They 
were to capture the roads leading from Malmedy and Elsenborn to Eupen, 
thereby aiding elements of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in their initial drive 
for the Meuse. On December 15 von der Heydte•s men were to be trucked to 
Paderborn where they would board their planes, but the trucks were de-
layed 24 hours for lack of tu.el. When gasoline was finally obtained, the 
mission proceeded with the paratroopers jumping in the early hours of De-
cember 17. By then, however, the Americans were aware of the attack, and 
the mission lost its value.34 
The main driving force in the Ardennes counteroffensive was to be 
Model's Arrrry (coup B. Its three attacking armies di.d have the promised 
12,000 tons of motor tu.el on the fog-shrouded morning of December 16. 
The Fifth and Sixth Panzer Armies received the bulk of this, as they had 
most of the 1,420 tankso This was enough to launch the initial attack, 
but the big question was just how far could Model's armies go on their 
allotment o~ fuel? The answer is clear: Army Group B received only 
enough gasoline to advance to the Meuse River and no farther.35 An ex-
a.mination of the plan of attack in relation to the fuel supply available 
shows this. 
The central axis of advance of Army (coup B was along a line ex-
tending roughly from Da.sburg on the Siegfried Line to Huy on the Meuse, 
or a flight distance of sixty miles. It was another seventy miles from 
the Meuse on to Antwerp. The 4,250,000 gallons that Model's three armies 
34cole, ..!h2, Ardennes, pp. 270-271. 
35Robert E. Merriam, Dark December; The Full Account of the Battle 
2£.. the Bulge (Chicago, 194rr,-p. 44; Taylor,° ~a German "o;n'e'ra:"1 Saw It," 
p. 54; Wilmot, ~ Struggle f2!. Enrope, pp. 578, 600, 608. 
received were equal to two "consumption units" of gasoline. In German 
military terminology one consumption unit of petrol was enough to move 
36 
an attacking unit's vehicles 100 kilometers, or sixty-three miles. 
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Model's divisions each received their proper proporti~n of Army Group B's 
overall allotment, or about two consumption units per division. If an 
armored division and an infantry division each received two consumption 
units of petrol, then obviously the panzer unit received a greater volume 
because it burned more. Nevertheless, the infantry division's two con-
sumption uni ts of fuel wccl.d move its few vehicles just as far as would 
the armored division's equivalent consumption units move its panzers. 
The issue varied in.volume, depending on the unit, but all division ve-
hicles in Army Group B, at least on paper, were capable of traveling 
sixty-three miles on one consumption unit of fuel. 
Realizing that one consumption unit would propel an attacking force 
sixty-three miles, and remembering that it was sixty miles from Dasrurg 
to the Meuse, why then was Army Group B unable to go beyond the Meuse 
with its two consumption units? Theoretically, Model's two consumption 
units shoul.d have been able to take his army group 130 miles, or all the 
way to Antwerp. The answer lies in the type of terrain through which 
the advance was to take place. According to General Bayerlein of Panzer 
Lehr, his division received their promised two consumption units, or 
enough for about 130 miles of normal driving, but due to the rough ter-
rain of the Ardennes, their allotted fuel could only take them sixty to 
seventy airline miles.37 
The Ardennes is an area of low mountains, and the terrain is most 
36cole, ~ Ardennes, p. 666. 
37Taylor, "As a German General Saw It," po 54. 
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difficult with many steep and narrow valleys. The region is laced with 
roads, but most of the primary avenues run southwest, or parallel with 
the main valleys. Part of the German success in the Ardennes in 1940 
was due to the fact that von Rundstedt's Army Group was able to break 
through the mountains by using the primary roads running southwest toward 
Sedan. But in December, 1944, the Germans were to find themselves ad-
vancing west and northwest against the mountains along winding, tor-
turous, secondary roads.38 Driving conditions like this simply require 
more fuel. Beyond the Meuse toward Antwerp, the terrain levels out. 
Here the consumption unit method of calculating fuel amounts would have 
been correct. Also, we must remember that while it was a sixty-mile 
flight distance to the Meuse, actual road mileage was much longer. 
In May, 1940, the Germans broke through the Ardennes during excel-
lent spring weathero But now in December, 1944, the German Army would 
be advancing in the dead of winter. This meant mud, snow, and ice, 
which in turn meant additional fuel consumption, since steel tracks and 
rubber tires skidd.ed over the roads and bogged down in the mud. Co'1-
sidering terrain, road distance, and weather4 it required at least two 
consumption units to reach the Meuse. Thus, Model was only to get half 
of the gas mileage that he had planned on.39 
Exactly how then did Hitler and OKW think that Army Group B would 
cross the Meuse, recapture Antwerp, and then turn and annihilate the 
northern Allied armies with two consumption uni ts of fuel? First, there 
is some evidence that OKWmay not have understood the problem of terrain 
and fuel consumption once the units were engaged in battle. To quote 
38Wilmot, ~ Struggle f.2!:. Europe, p. 580. 
39cole, !h2, Ardennes, p. 666. 
General von Manteuffel: 
Part of the trouble was that OKWworked on a mathematical 
and stereotyped calculation of the amount of petrol re-
quired to move a division for a hundred kilometerso lt7' 
experience in Russia had taught me that double this scale 
was really needed under43attlefield conditions. Jodl 
didn't understand thiso 
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While misunderstandings in the calculation of Army Group B's fuel require-
ments may have arisen, the Fuehrer probably realized all along that 
4,250,000 gallons would never be sufficient to reach Antwerpo Hitler 
and OKW had been dealing with problems of this very nature for over five 
years, and it is unlikely that they had not profited from past experienceo 
Moreover, there is striking proof that OKW was aware of Amy Group 
B's gasoline deficiencyo One of the chief objectives along the route of 
advance through the Ardennes was American fuel dumps. The Germans most 
certainly had their eyes on the huge 3,000,000 gallon supply of fuel near 
the American First Army headquarters at Spa.41 If this fuel dump could 
have been captured, Model's gasoline supply would have been increased by 
almost seventy-five per cent. On December 6 Jodl asked von Rundstedt 
about the plans for capturing American fuel, 42 an obvious admission that 
Jodl himself was aware of the critical shortageo By the time of the De~ 
camber 12 Ziegenberg meeting, the assembled generals realized that they 
did not have enough petrol, and would have to rely heavily on what they 
could capture.43 
40Liddell-Hart, The German Generals Talk, P• 278. 
- -
41mumentritt, ''Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Own Story of the Battle 
of the Bulge," P• 19; Wilmot, ~ Struggle .!.2£. Europe, P• 584. 
,. 
42Telegram from Jodl to Rundstedt, December 6, 1944, U. s., Records 
of German Field Commands, Army Groups, Part I, Microfilm Roll No .. 18, 
Item 75144/46 a-f, Frame Noso 7020553. 
43Wilmot, ~ Struggle !2!_ ~rope, P• 578. 
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In reality, it ma.de little difference whether OKW misunderstood fuel 
requirements or banked on seizing America~ gasoline. If OKW had been 
able to scrape up more fuel, Army Group B most certainly would have re-
ceived it. The German commanders. were acutely aware of the deficiency. 
Most of them had been in top command positions on the fronts for over 
five years, and were most knowledgeable concerning their unit's fuel re-
quirements. Too, they were not as optimistic as the Fuehrer and OKW con-
earning the capture of American fuel dumps in the Ardennes. They were, 
moreover, left in the dark as to where most of the prospective gasoline 
supplies were located, 44 since Hitler had forbidden air reconnaissance 
prior to the attacko 
The officers who were charged with the responsibility of capturing 
Antwerp were most dissatisfied with their allotted two consumption units. 
Ii"rom von Rundstedt on down, they asked Hitler and OKW for more fuel. On 
December 6 von Rundstedt requested 12,000 cubic meters of gasolineo The 
field marshal p.eeded one-half of this amount by December 12, and the re-
maining half before the end of the third day of the offensive. other-
wise, said von Rundstedt, the offensive would come to a standstill. He 
reminded Jodl of Rommel's unfortunate fuel experiences at El Alameino45 
Field Marshal Model requested five consumption units. 46 The commander 
of the Fifth Panzer Army, von Manteuffel, had the following to say: 
Taking account of the extra difficulties likely to be met 
in a winter battle in such difficult country as the Ardennes, 
I told Hitler personally that five times the standard scale 
44Ibid. 
45tetter from von Rundstedt to Jodl, December 6, 1944, U. s., 
Records of German Field Commands, fil!!!Z Groups, Part I, Microfilm Roll Noo 
18, Item~5144/40 a-f, Frame Nos. 70205ZilC?020545. 
46cole, ~ Ardennes, Pe 666. 
of petrol supply ought to be provided. Actually, when the 
offensive was launched, only one and a half times the 
standard scale had been provided.47 
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Down at division level, General Bayerlein had anticipated receiving five 
consumption uni ts, but obtained only two. 48 Top ranking German quarter-
master officers, men who constantly handled fuel problems, estimated that 
Army Group B would consume over 1,000,000 gallons per day while.in the 
attack.49 At that rate Model's fuel supply would have lasted four days, 
and Hitler did not count on reaching Antwerp until the fourteenth day. 
The quartermasters' estimate was somewhat high, as a few leading panzer 
units kept moving until the eighth day before they ran out of gasoline. 
These units, however, were isolated cases, for as we shall see, most di-
visions began experiencing fuel problems on the third and fourth days. 
What was the nature of these fuel problems? Rather than discuss 
Army Group Bas a whole, our purpose can better be served by examining 
first the fuel problems of Dietrich's Sixth SS Panzer Army and then con-
sidering those of von Manteuffel 9 s Fifth Panzer Arm.yo B:randenberger•s 
Seventh Army played an important role, but Dietrich and von Manteuffel had 
the bulk of the gasoline-burning vehicles and consequently the greatest 
difficultieso 
The eighty-five mile front between Monschau and F.chternach had been 
asleep since September, but on the morning of December 16, 1944, it was 
rudely awakened. Two thousand German guns began shelling U. s. Army po-
sitions, while Army Group B's thirteen infantry divisions moved forward 
out of the Ei.fel, across the Sieg.fried Linej and fell upon the surprised 
47Liddell-Hart, ~ Germ.an Generals .!.!lk, p. 2780 
48Taylor, 0As a German General Saw It," p .. 540 
49cole, ..'.!'.h!. Ardennes, Po 73. 
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Americans. Immediately behind came the five vaunted panzer divisions, 
ready to exploit the initial breakthrough. Hitler had planned for the 
Sixth SS to receive all the glory by taking the lead all the way to Ant-
werp. He was to be disappo;nted. Unlike the experience of the Fifth 
Panzer Anny on the morning of December 16, Sixth SS lacked initial mo-
bility and crash effect -- prerequisites for a successful armored pene-
tration.50 By December 23, Dietrich's lead elements were halted twenty 
r 
miles east of the Meuse, while most of his divisions never advanced more 
than ten miles beyond the Siegfried Line. According to von Rundstedt, 
the Sixth SS Panzer Army's mission was unsuccessful because of stubborn 
American resistance and a shortage of f'uel.51 
Dietrich's plans called for three of his infantry divisions to take 
the towns of Monschau and Butgenbach on the first day of the attack, and, 
if successful, drive on northwest to the Eupen-Verviers area and establish 
a blocking position. This was to prevent uni ts of the First and Ninth 
American Armies from driving south against the northern flanks of Diet-
rich's 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions, which were to advance west as 
rapidly as possible, capture Malmedy and Stavelot, and push on to the 
Meuse. Meanwhile, Dietrich's 2nd and 9th SS Panzer Divisions were to be 
held in reserve, ready to be fed into any penetration. 
On the sixteenth Dietrich's infantry attack smashed headlong into 
the American 2nd and 99th Divisions, which were deployed on the Siegfried 
Line for attack against the Roer River dams. South of Monschau the 
Americans wavered and fell back four miles to Butgenbach, where they 
50Guderian, Panzer Leader, pp. 380-381; Wilmot,~ Struggle for 
Europe, p. 576. For the movements of the German units, see Map No~, 
Appendix A. 
5lshulman, Defeat !!l ~ ~' p. 234. 
established a strong defense line along a ridge from Monschau south to 
Bu.tgenbach. A few hours later Dietrich threw in the 12th SS Panzer D:i-
vi~ion, but neither it nor the three infantry divisions could break 
through the line, let alone take the two vital towns. Because of stout 
.American resistance, which was later reinforced by units of the u. s. 
Ninth Army, ftlndstedt's apprehensions concerning the objectives or the 
Sixth SS Panzer Army were confirm.~d: the northern Monschau-Butgenbach 
shoulder was never captured, and many good divisions of the Sixth SS were 
tied down and deflected :from their goals or the Meuse and Antwerpo52 
Meanwhile, eight miles southeast of Butgenbach the Americans were 
confronted with a crisis that rapidly assumed alarming proportions. On 
the evening of the sixteenth, the notorious Kam.pfgruppe Peiper,53 spear-
head of the 1st SS Panzer Division, smashed through the Losheim Gap, 
sending the surprised .Americans reeling back~ '!his battle group was a 
heavily reinforced armored regiment commanded by SS Colonel Joachim 
Peiper, whose mission was to clear the way :for the 1st SS Panzer Divisiono 
Peiper's regiment consisted of a battalion of Mark IV and Panther tanks, 
an armored infantry battalion, a battery of self-propelled 105-mm guns, 
a flak battalion, a parachute company, and later a battalion or Tiger 
tanks. Most of the 1st SS Panzer Division's tanks were in Peipe~•s 
unit • .54 
Peiper gave the Americans an initial shock, but the days of his 
52mumentritt, "Field Marshal von Rundstedt's Own Story of the 
Battle of the Bulge," P• 20. · · 
53Kam.pfgru.ppe Peiper was responsible for the December 17 murder of 
eighty-six .American prisoners of war, the "Malmedy Massacre." For a de-
tailed account see Cole, l'h:!, Ardennes, pp; 261.264. 
54 Cole, !ht Ardennes, P• 339. 
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success were numbered as he too soon ran out of gasoline. Along the 
route of advance, Peiper was hard pressed to obtain fuel for his heavily 
reinforced armored regiment. In the Sixth SS sector of advance, Kampf-
gruppe Peiper went farther and faster than any unit, and consequently 
burned more fuel than did any Sixth SS unit of comparable size. Wi.th 
this in mind, it is now necessary to dwell at some length on this battle 
group's daring advance. 
'!hroughout most of the sixteenth, Peiper's unit waited impatiently 
behind the West Wall. The 12th Volksgrenadier Division had failed to 
punch a hole in the American 99th Division defenses for Peiper's armor 
to pass through. Late in the afternoon Peiper himself went up to the 
front and angrily tried to alleviate the holdup by directing traffic. 
Not until 7:30 .P.M. did Peiper reach I.osheim, whereupon he was ordered 
to advance west along a secondary road toward Lanzerath instead of di-
rectly northwest .along the primary road to Bullingen. A railroad over-
pass had been blown up, blocld.ng the main road from Losheim to Bullingen. 
Kampfgruppe Peiper advanced on through the night, and by 4:00 A.M. on the 
seventeenth he had driven through La.nzerath and had captured Honsfeld. 
At Honsfeld, Peiper saw an opportunity to drive due west to Schoppen, 
thereby.;eliminating the necessity of taking the longer way through Bul-
lingen. The road to Schoppen, however, was not paved, and something else 
attracted Peiper's eye. During the night his Kampfgruppe had consumed an 
unexpected amount of fuel in negotiating the secondary roads from Losheim 
to Honsfeld, and at Blllingen was an American fuel dump. Peiper was 
successful in taking Bullingen, the American gasoline was captured, and 
American prisoners were forced to fill the regiment's fuel tanks.55 
55Ibid., p. 261; Wilmot, !.h2. Struggle £2!: Enrope, p. 583. 
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Throughout the seventeenth, Peiper's column advanced due west out 
of Bullingen and met very little American resistance. By 2:00 P.M. 
Ligneuville had been taken and the road lay open to Stavelot. Peiper•s 
lead troops reached the southern outskirts of Sta.velot at dusk, and saw 
that the town was full of American trucks heading north. The Kampfgruppe 
did not realize it, but the trucks were moving up to help evacuate 
the gasoline from the big First Army dumps south of Spa.56 The Ameri-
cans were aware of the Germans' fuel plight and were in no way ready to 
help them, for they removed almost 3,000,000 gallons from the Spa dump.57 
Not only did Peiper's deep advance alarm the Americans, but so did 
his attempts to capture American fuel. OKW believed that there would be 
an abundance of stored gasoline in the Ardennes area to support the com-
ing .American offensive. They were correct, as the U. s. First Army, for 
example, had almost 3,000,000 gallons in dumps just north of Malmedy and 
Stavelot, directly on the axis of the 1st SS Panzer Division's advance.58 
For Kampfgruppe Peiper this would offer a tremendous prize, and if cap.. 
tured, the fuel would have taken the Sixth SS all the way to the Meuse 
and beyond.59 On December 18, after throwing the American defenders out 
of Stavelot, Peiper immediately sent detachments of tanks north along 
the road toward Francorchamps and the First Army fuel dumps. But Peiper's 
troops were in for a surprise, and the booty was to be denied them. Upon 
retreating north out of Sta.velot, the Americans realized that they were 
56cole, .Ih2, Ardennes, p. 265. 
57 Omar N. Bradley,! Soldier's Story, p. 475. 
58Ibid., p. 584; Francis T. Miller, History .2!. W:>rld !f!!:. ll (Phila-
delphia, 1945), P• 791. 
59Cole, Ih2, Ardennes, p. 266. 
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being pursued by Peiper's armor toward the big fuel dump. About two 
miles north of Stavelot, the Americans emptied 124,000 gallons of gaso-
line on the road and ignited it to form a perfect tank barrier.60 The 
Germans were denied the fuel dumps and the Americans had more time to 
evacuate them. This was the closest that any unit in Army Group Bever 
got to a major fuel dump, although several smaller ones were captured. 
:DJ.ring the night and into the morning of the eighteenth, Peiper was 
momentarily held up on the south side of the Ambleve River. The main 
bridge across the river and leading directly into Stavelot was being 
stubbornly held by the Americans. Nevertheless, by the morning of the 
eighteenth Peiper had forced his way across the bridge and into the town. 
Once in Stavelot he wheeled southwest for Trois Ponts, the site of his 
next objective, the bridges across the Salm and Ambleve Rivers. Once 
they were taken, Peiper would then be able to drive straight west through 
W'erbomont to Huy on the Meuse, about thirty-five road miles away. On the 
road to Trois Ponts Peiper once again began to worry about the amount of 
fuel that his tanks were consuming and the supply which was not coming 
up as expected.61 Nevertheless, he kept going, and upon reaching Trois 
Ponts ran into trouble. :Die to the valiant efforts of a company of 
American combat engineers, the attempt to seize the bridges at Trois 
Ponts was repulsed; they were blown up in the faces of the advancing Ger-
mans. Even if Peiper had captured the bridges it would have made little 
difference, for he himself later admitted that still another condition 
would have had to be met: "If we had captured the bridge at Trois Ponts 
60Ibid.. . p. 266; Hanson w. Baldwin, "Our Greatest Battle: The Full 
Drama,"~~ Times Ma~azine, December 15, 1946, p. 67; Wilmot, ~ 
Struggle !2!: Europe, p. 5 4. 
6lcole, T.he Ardennes, P• 267. 
intact and~ had enough~, it would have been a simple matter to 
drive through to the Meuse early that day."62 
Even though Peiper had lost his direct route to Huy and was aware 
that the fuel situation was now assuming alarming proportions, he was 
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not dismayed. His unit was now leading the Sixth SS, and Dietrich's eyes 
were upon it. Accordingly, Peiper turned his tanks away from Trois Ponts 
and headed northwest. The power of Ka.mpfgruppe Peiper was, however, al-
most sapped, for it now had fuel for only a few more mil.es.63 Because 
the bridges across the Ambleve and the Salm were denied him, Peiper had 
to pass through La Cll.eize and Stoumont, both about four miles northwest 
of Trois Ponts. Early on the nineteenth, the Kampfgruppe made its way 
through La Cileize and then Stoumont. Two and one-half miles west of 
Stoumont lay Peiper's next goal -- a bridge across the Ambleve, which, 
if taken intact, would reopen the way to Werbomont and then to Huy on 
the Meuse. Peiper advanced west out of Stoumont toward the bridge, but 
a lack of petrol thwarted him. In his own words, "We began to realize 
that we had insufficient gasoline to cross the bridge west of Stoumont."64 
So on December 19 Ka.mpfgruppe Peiper withdrew to Stoumont where it 
was practically immobilized for lack of gasoline. Had the Americans de-
nied him the Ambleve bridge, he could still have easily turned north 
toward Spa, the location of the American First Army headquarters, and 
then on to the Meuse. But as it was, Peiper found himself stalled in the 
Ambleve valley losing precious time. For the Americans were now fully 
aware of the Sixth SS Panzer Army's threat, and were moving south against 
62Ibid. The italics are mine. 
63Ibid., p. 339; Walter P. Hall, Iron Out of Calvary; An Interpre-
~ History .2!. ~ Second vk>rld li!!:, (NewYork,1946), p. 345. 
64cole, ~ Ardennes, P• 342. 
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the fianks of Kampfgruppe Peiper and the whole Sixth ss. 
On the nineteenth, American units retook Sta.velot, blocking Peiper•s 
main route of supply. His fate was now sealed. With no gasoline he 
could not fight his way out of the La Gleize-Stoumont pocket. Though 
Peiper made his plight known to the Sixth SS headquarters, it was not 
until December 21 that help came. On that night the Luftwaffe flew a 
gasoline resupply mission to Peiper, but he only received enough fuel to 
move his tanks to better firing positions and keep his radio generators 
going. 65 Where was the Kampfgruppe's northern flank protection, the 12th 
SS Panzer Division? The division got no farther than the Butgenbach 
area. On the 20th it was facing severe American resistance, and was out 
of gasoline.66 On the twenty-third Kampfgruppe Peiper began retreating, 
but the going was difficult. On December 26 the last German was thrown 
out of the La Gleize-Stoumont pocket, thus ending the effectiveness of 
the Sixth SS Panzer Army in the Ardennes. Peiper and only 800 of his 
original 2,000 troops escaped back to the German lines. 67 
While the advance of Y.ampfgruppe Peiper and its fuel problems held 
the limelight in the Sixth SS Panzer A:rm.y sector, no single unit was to 
do so in the Fifth Panzer Army. Von Manteuffel's army was the far more 
successful one. Several full divisions advanced much farther than did 
Dietrich's one reinforc,ed regiment, and consequently, the Fifth' s fuel 
problems were of greater magnitude. In relating the Fifth Panzer A:rm.y's 
fuel problems, better insight can be offered if first the whole army is 
considered and then the individual divisions. 
65Ibid., p. 369. 
66rbid., p. 667. 
67Wllmot, 1h.2, Struggle.!£!: Europe, p. 594n. 
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As early as December 19, when the Americans were rapidly falling 
back, the Fifth Panzer Army reported a "badly strained" fuel situation. 
Two days later, when the Sixth SS was hopelessly bogged down and Fifth 
Panzer was well out in front, many of von Manteuffel's divisions were 
grinding to a halt for lack of gasoline. His lead elements were still 
thirty miles from the Meuse, and fuel deliveries were not coming up as 
expected. On the twenty-second, General Heinrich von Luettwitz, com-
mander of the Fifth Panzer Army's XLVIIth Panzer Corps advancing west of 
Bastogne, reported that his armored drive was "gravely endangered" be-
cause of a shortage of fuel.68 By December 24, with the Sixth SS halted 
and in same places retreating, the Fifth Panzer Army was near the Meuse. 
Von Manteuffel began demanding that OKW give him the reserve divisions . 
earmarked for Dietrich. Not until the twenty-sixth, however, did OKW's 
reserve divisions receive orders to move into the Fifth Panzer Army 
sector, but most of them could not move. They had no fuel.69 
What was the situation at lo-wer echelons? At division level one 
can best see how Army Group B's shortage of fuel hindered and in many 
cases halted the advance of the lead army in Hitler's last big offensive. 
First, we shall focus our attention on two divisions in the Fifth Panzer 
Army's northern sector, the 116th Panzer Division and the 2nd SS Panzer 
Division. Then the Panzer Lehr Division and the 2nd Panzer Division in 
von Manteuffel's southern sector will be considered. 
On the first day of the attack the 116th Panzer Division, commanded 
by General Siegfried von Waldenburg, moved out and tried to cross the 
Our River at Ouren, but elements of the American 28th Infantry Division 
68cole, ~ Ardennes, p. 667. 
69tiddell-Ha.rt, ~ German Generals ..'.!!!k, p. 291. 
90 
turned them back. The 116th did not press the attack, but instead moved 
south to cross at Dasburg. On the way they ran out of fuel, and because 
of this and a traffic jam, they did not cross the Qir until the seven-
teenth. December 20 found von Waldenburg's division in control of 
Houffalize, whereupon they then struck west for La Roche, on the Ourthe 
River, about thirty miles east of the Meuse. On the way, the 116th cap-
tured the town of Samree and 25,000 gallons of American gasoline. At 
dawn on December 24, the 116th Panzer Division was assembled and ready 
to attack the road between Ma.rche and Hotton, held by units of the U. s. 
84th Infantry Division. If successful, von Waldenburg could then quickly 
wheel west and assist the advance guard of the 2nd Panzer Division, 
which was now stalled between Ciney and Calles, only four miles from the 
Meuse. But the 116th was also out of gasoline, a new supply did not ar-
rive, and its commander had to settle for an unsuccessful infantry at-
.. 
tack with no armored support. As a result the 116th Panzer Division did 
not arrive in time to save the 2nd Panzer at Celles.?O 
Eighteen miles north of Bastogne, on the highway to Liege on the 
Meuse, lay the town of Baraque de Fraiture, in the Fifth Panzer Army's 
sector of advance. On December 19, elements of the American 3rd Armored 
Division and the 82nd Airborne Division moved south with the intention 
of making a stand at Baraque de Fraiture and blocking the main route to 
Liege. On the twenty-second the Americans at Baraque de Frai'blre began 
wondering what had happened to the Germans, as the 2nd SS Panzer Di-
vision, commanded by General Heinz Lammerding, had moved down from the 
Sixth SS Panzer Army's reserve area and was supposed to have attacked 
the day before. On December 22 Lammerding's division had run out of 
70cole, ..'.!h2. Ardennes, PP• 204, 357-359, 442. 
fuel, and they remained idle the entire day about ten miles south of 
Ba.raque de Fraiture waiting for fuel to arrive. 
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On the evening of .the twenty-second enough fuel arrived to get part 
of the 2nd SS Panzer moving again. The Americans, hopelessly out-
numbered, were pushed out of Ba.raque de Fraiture on the twenty-third but 
La.mm.erding could go no farther than Manhay, a few miles north of 139.raque 
de Fraiture. 'Ihroughout the twenty-third he received only a trickle of 
fuel. Because of the Germans' lack of fuel the Americans had time to 
rush in reinforcements for Ma.nhay, and thereby block this vital route to 
Liege. Even had the Americans failed to hold the highway, the 2nd SS 
Panzer Division would have lacked the necessary gasoline to drive on to 
71 Liege. 
In the Fifth Panzer Army's southern sector, along the route of ad-
vance through Ba.stogne on west to the Meuse, von Manteuffel was to ex-
perience an even more discouraging fuel problem. On the first day of the 
attack, General Luettwi tz' s XLVIIth Panzer Corps comprising the Panzer 
Lehr Division, the 2nd Panzer Division, and the 26th Volksgrenadier Di-
vision, quickly smashed through the American 28th Infantry Division de-
fenses and headed for Bastogne. By 10:00 P.M. on the eighteenth General 
Fritz Bayerlein and his Panzer Lehr Division, along with Colonel Meinrad 
von Lauchert and his 2nd Panzer Division, were on the outskirts of Bas-
togne, twenty miles west of the Siegfried Line. With the exception of 
the Bastogne garrison, the Americans were completely overwhelmed in the 
XLVIIth Panzer Corp's route of advance. Early on the nineteenth Bayer-
lien failed in his attempt to take Bastogne. The night before, the 
American lOlst Airborne Division had been rushed into Bastogne from 
71.Ibid., PP• 389-391, 583. 
France, and the town was to become a rock of defiance and a constant 
source of anguish to the German commanderso72 
92 
Bastogne was the key road junction town in the Ardennes, with six 
routes feeding into ito As long as the Americans held it9 the Germans 
were denied the continued use of the main highways to the Meuse and on 
to Antwerpo Von Manteuffel 8 s panzers had to take tortu.ous secondary 
roads and cross over open country to bypass the towno In the process 
they consumed a terrific amount of fuel. 
Since repeated attempts to capture Bastogne on the nineteenth were 
unsuccessful, von Luettwitz ordered the 26th Volksgrenadier Division to 
contain the town while the 2nd Panzer and Panzer Lehr were to drive on 
west to the Meuseo 73 A regiment of Panzer Lehr, however, was unable to 
break loose from Bastogne, and the 2nd Panzer Division moved on aloneo 
Not until the twenty-second did Bayerlein free himself to move on in 
force to assist 2nd Panzero Panzer Lehr was then urged on, if necessary 
by foot, if gasoline was unobtainableo74 
On the twenty-fourth the Panzer Lehr Division was in Rochefort, 
only fifteen miles from the Meuse, when fuel ran shorto Bayerlein was 
promised replacements, but they were unable to move up because of a lack 
of gasolineo By Christmas Day Bayerlein had lost the effect of thirty 
of his tanks, as they were either in need of fuel or repairso Tank 
breakdowns became commono This was the price Army Group B had to pay 
for not having sufficient gasoline to ru.n in the new Panther and Tiger 
72For the complete story of the valiant defense of Bastogne sees. 
L.A. Marshall, Bastogne 9 ~ Story _2! .!:!:!! First Eight Days (Washington, 
19/f6)o . 
73wilmot, ~ .Struggle f.2r. Enrope 9 Po 587 o 
74Taylor9 "As a German General Saw It," po 550 
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engines.75 That same day Bayerlein attempted to reach out west to the 
Meuse and rescue the 2nd Panzer Division, but he was too late. American 
pressure from the north steadily began to press in on Panzer Lehr's 
flank, and on the twenty-sixth Bayerlein began retreating. 
Returning to von La.uchert and the 2nd Panzer Division, it is inter-
esting to note that this division's fate was similar to that of Kampf-
gruppe Peiper. The consequences were, however, far more disappointing, 
as the 2nd Panzer Division almost reached the Meuse before .running out 
of fuel. Von La.uchert quickly extricated his division from Bastogne, 
and by the twentieth was dashing ~est for the Meuse. The 2nd Panzer Di-
vision became the spearhead of Army Group B, paving the way for the rest 
of Model's divisions. 
December 20 found von La.uchert attacking Ortheuville, seven miles 
northwest of Bastogne. American resistance was no match for the more 
powerful 2nd Panzer Division. Early on the twenty-first von La.uchert 
captured the town and then prepared to drive west for Marche on the road 
to the Meuse. The way, however, was not open. With luck, the 2nd Pan-
zer could have reached the Meuse in twenty-four hours, but von Lauchert 
was now forced to dole out fuel in cans, and for several days the panzer 
fuel tanks had never been completely f'ull.76 The Americans spent De-
cember 21 waiting for the 2nd Panzer Division at Marche, but they never 
arrived. Von La.uchert spent the whole day in an assembly area west of 
Ortheuville wai.ting for fuel to come up. 77 This gave the Americans 
75Ibid.; Wilmot, ~ Struggle f2.!: Ell.rope, p. 609. 
76Toland, Battle; 1h2, Story 2£ ~ Bulge, P• 236. 
77 Cole,~ Ardennes, p. 321. 
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plenty of time to reinforce Marche. The Germans never captured the 
town, and as a result they were denied two important roads leading north-
west through Namur and Liege to Antwerp. 
Nevertheless, von Lauchert was undaunted. On the twenty-second, 
after finally obtaining fuel, the division headed southwest, bypassed 
Rochefort, and then dashed northwest for the Meuse. By the evening of 
the next day advance elements of 2nd Panzer were only four miles from 
Dinant on the Meuse, and word was flashed to Hitler that his troops 
could now see the river from a high ridge. Beyond the Meuse lay sixty 
miles of flat country perfect for panzer operations, and Antwerp would 
be theirs. Unfortunately for the Gennan Anny, this was to be their last 
look at the Meuse.78 
On December 23 American troops intercepted a 2nd Panzer Division 
headquarters message inquiring whether any of its units had captured any 
fuel. To Field Marshal Montgomery this was "the writing on the wall. n79 
On Christmas Eve, Model reported to von Rundstedt that the 2nd Panzer 
Division was only four miles from Meuse but completely out of gasoline. 
Throughout the twenty-fifth the 2nd Panzer radioed for more fuel, but 
none was forthcoming. On this decisive Christmas Day the American 2nd 
Armored Divi.~ion lashed out at von Lauchert's exposed salient. The 
battle raged for two days and though Panzer Lehr and the 9th Panzer Di-
vision tried to help, they were unsuccessful. Von Lauchert•s division, 
unable to maneuver its tanks and assault guns for lack of fuel, was 
smashed. Over three-fourths of his tanks and assault guns were captured 
78Wi.lmot, !h2. Struggle £Q!:. Europe, P• 602. 
79 
Ibid., p. 598. 
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or destroyedoBO 
In considerlng the various actions discussed above 9 a definite 
question emerges~ Why did many of ~todel 0s divisions run out of fuel on 
the third and fourth days of the offensive when they were barely twenty 
miles from the West Wall, with over forty miles to go before reaching 
the Meuse? These divisions supposedly had enough of their own fuel to 
drive as far as the Meuse and then on to Antwerp with captured fuelo 
Clearly, this was not the case with Kampfgruppe Peiper, the 2nd SS Panzer 
Division, and the 116th Panzer Divisiono They sputtered out of fuel ~ 
fore ever reaching the Spa=Houffalize=Bastogne lineo Two answers to this 
question present themselvesg Firstg because of difficult roads and 
tactical conditions, Army Group B initially consumed an unexpectedly 
large quantity of f'uelo Secondly, there is some evidence that part of 
the 4,250,000 gallon fuel supply remained back at the Rhine on the open-
ing day of the offensive and never reached the front at allo 
On the night of December 16-17 Kampfgruppe Peiper consumed an unex-
pected amount of fuel in negotiating the southwest turn around Losheimo 
Next, Peiper found himself writhing in the tortu\00.!'l Ambleve valley with 
American troops n1oving in on his northern flanko He was unable to break 
out and was using more fuel than OKW had plannedo General von Waldenberg 
and his 116th Pa.11zer Division had planned to drive straight west out of 
the Eifel area and across the Our River in the vicinity of Oureno Foiled 
in this attempt9 von Waldenburg turned south and crossed at Dasburgo 
This cost the 116th Panzer Division some twenty extra miles and an 
80Hanson W., Baldwin9 "Gr~at Decision9 " .Ib!, Infantry Journal, LX (May9 
1947) 11 ppo 16 9 21~ Toland 9 Battle; k Story .2£ ~ Bulge 9 po 242; Wl.lmot9 
The Struggle !2t, Ehrope 9 ppo 601 9 602n; Cole, h Ardennes9 PPo 443, 564, 
567=5680 
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excessive amount of fuel. 
Bastogne is probably the best example of OKW's miscalculation on 
fuel planningo The town was expected to fall immediately. It did not, 
and American resistance resulted in von Manteuffel's panzers consuming 
tremendous quantities of fuel in by-passing the town. A straight run 
through Bastogne would have alleviated many of the Fifth Panzer Army's 
gasoline problems. Thus, American resistance, resulting in unexpected 
maneuvering for the Germans, cost Arm.y Group B dearly. On December 18 
M:>del's fuel consumption rate reached 2,000 cubic meters (500,000 gallons) 
per day. At that rate Model's fuel supply would be gone in eight or nine 
days. 
day. 
By December 23, consumption was down to 1,000 cubic meters per 
81 Clearly, the supply would not meet the demand. 
Hugh M. Cole and Robert E. Merriam,82 in their works on the Ardennes 
counteroffensive, state that perhaps as much as one-half of Model's 
4,250,000 gallons of fuel was stored back at Rhine railheads on the open-
ing day of hostilities. Assuming this to be the case, it would partly 
account for the many divisions which were forced to halt on December 18 
and 19. Leading divisions of Army Group B did not even have all of their 
allotted fuelo Model was allotted only enough fuel to reach the Meuse, 
not Antwerp. With divisions having fuel problems only three and four 
days after the offensive, and some forty miles to go before reaching the 
Meuse, it was absolutely essential that the gasoline be brought up im-
mediately and fed into the offensive. It was, for how else could 2nd 
Panzer, 116th Panzer, and Panzer Lehr have reached the Meuse7 Divisions 
81For the Army Group B's fuel consumption rate see Cole, ..!h2_ !!_-
dennes, p .. 666. 
82Ibid., p. 68; Merriam, ~ December; ~ .Ml Account 2!. ~ 
Battle 2f. ~ Ihlge, p. 43 .. 
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that had run out of :fuel on the 18th9 19th9 and 20th of December were re= 
fueledo 
Both Cole and Merriam imply that Model may have had transport 
trouble 9 and that the gasoline that was supposedly back at the Rhine 
never reached Model 0 s lj420 tanks and assault gunso The facts indicate 
otherwiseo If fuel was available at the Rhine 9 then obviously there was 
enough to propel transport truckso The rail system leading into the 
E:ifel was still in good shapeo And of most importance 9 the Allied tacti-
cal air forces with their ability to destroy fuel tra.nsport trucks 9 trains, 
highways, bridges9 and railroad~ were unable to fiyo Hitler had chosen 
the time of the .offensive to coincide with ten days of bad weather9 and 
the Allied tactical air forces were grounded until December 230 lt>del 
had an umbrella for eight days, and p.e used it wello Not only were Ger-
man divisions able to advance into the Ardennes without fear of air at... 
tack9 but fuel transport trucks and trains were able to move up from the 
Rhineo Not until December 23 did Allied planes began to interdict 
seriously German fuel transporto But this made little difference then, 
as the fuel supply was already insufficient,83 and most of Model 0 s di= 
visions were al.ready immobilizedo 
Von Rundstedt tried vainly to assist Army Group B i n its plighto 
While the field marshal may have been out of favor with Hitler and not 
in direct control of the attack9 he was not going to sit idly by and 
watch Army Group B die for lack of fuel o On December 19, when the fuel 
crisis began to reach alarming proportions, von Rundstedt told Model 
that his greatest worry at tha.t time was the gasoline supply o The Al= 
lies had just bombed four big synthetic fuel plants~ and the f'uel 
83m.umentritt, ''Field Marshal von Rundstedt0 s Own Story of the 
Battle of the Bulge 9 " Po 220 
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shortage in the Ardennes would increase. It would be a tragedy if their 
armies came to a standstill for lack of gasoline. He informed Model 
that OB West was doing everything possible to get all available gasoline 
up to Army Group Band that the sharpest fuel limitations possible were 
being imposed upon all divisions on the Western Front not actually en-
gaged in the counteroffensive. In return Model was to do everything 
humanly possible to economize on gasoline.84 Thus, it is inconceivable 
that von Rundstedt would allow some 2,000,000 gallons of fuel to remain 
on the Rhine when his headquarters was doing everything possible to 
channel fuel into the Ardennes. 
The field marshal's efforts and those of many other skilled and 
dedicated German comm.anders were of no avail. Hitler's supreme gamble 
had failed. In the last week of December the Germans kept up the pres-
sure at Bastogne and fought fierce defensive battles against the American 
forces closing in on the northern and southern flanks, but it was a losing 
fight. By the end of December most German comm.anders saw the writing on 
the wall. It was not, however, until January 9 that Hitler consented to 
a complete withdrawal from the German Bulge.85 Even in retreat Model was 
plagued with fuel problems. Most of the 4,250,000 gallons had been 
spent. On December 28, when the Germans were no longer gazing on the 
Meuse, von Rundstedt received a telegram from Model asking for more 
fuel,86 but the field marshal had already done all he could. The storage 
84:retter from von Rundstedt to Model, December 19, 1944, U. s., 
Records of German Field Comm.ands, Army Groups, Part I, Microfilm Roll 
No. 18, Item 75144/40 a-f, Frame Nos. 7020752-7020753· 
85 Shulman, Defeat !!2 ~ ~, p. 246. 
86Telegram from Model to von Rundstedt, December 28, 1944, U. s., 
Records of German Field Comm.ands, Army Groups, Part I, Microfilm Roll 
No. 18, Item 75144/46 a-f, Frame No. 7020781. 
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tanks were almost dry. General Bayerlein, in discussing the retreat of 
Panzer Lehr, lamented that "fuel was so desperately scarce that in re-
aligning my division a regiment marched on foot through the snow from 
the extreme north to the extreme south end; there was no gasoline to be 
spared.n87 Bayerlein's division was not the only one in the XLV!Ith 
Panzer Corps that was practically immobile. lAJ.ring the last week in De-
cember OKW g,ave two more divisions to Inettwitz, making him a total of 
five. Little was gained, for by the last day of the year three of these 
divisions were almost useless for lack of gasoline.88 In less than a 
month after the offensive began, many a German panzer trooper who had 
driven west from the Siegfried Line with full fuel tanks was now walking 
east back to Germany. His vaunted Panther or Tiger starved for fuel, was 
left behind. 
In analyzing a great battle it is most difficult to give one_ specific 
reason as to why one army lost and the other won. This is no less true 
for the Ardennes counteroffensive. Nevertheless, one reason stands out 
among all others: HitJ.er's insufficient fuel reserves to reach his ob-
jective. For a moment, let us become armchair tacticians and make li-
beral use of the word "if. 11 .!!. Kampfgruppe Peiper had had enough fuel, 
it could have crossed the bridge west of Stoumont and then dashed on to 
the Meuse • .!!. the 116th Panzer Division had had full fuel tanks on De-
cember 24, von Waldenburg could have sent his armor along with the in-
fantry in attacking the Ma.rche-Hotton highway. 1f. the 2nd SS Panzer Di-
vision had had enough fuel on December 22, they could have easily driven 
north, crushed the weak American resistance at Ma.nhay, and then dashed 
87nie ~ Reports, P• 425. 
88cole, ~ Ardennes, P• 667. 
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on to the Meuse the same day. !! the Panzer Lehr division had had suf-
ficient gasoline on December 24, Ba.yerlein's unit more than likely could 
have saved the 2nd Panzer Division• s extended salient. And finally, !!, 
the 2nd Panzer Division had received more fuel, it would be interesting 
to contemplate the chagrin of the Allied commanders as they tried to 
cope with a German armored column out on the flat country beyond the 
Meuse, racing for Antwerp. But the fact is that Army Group B received 
only enough fuel to drive to the Meuse and without captured American 
gasoline could never cross the river. 
If it had not been for the Allied air offensive on the German oil 
industry, Army Ch-oup B undoubtedly would have crossed the Meuse and might 
well have reached Antwerp. Many highly-placed wartime leaders have at-
tested to the effectiveness of these raids and their impact on the Ar-
dennes counteroffensive. General H. H. Arnold stated that when the of-
fensive began, the Allied strategic raids on German oil had "put motor 
fuel in critical shortage • ..89 Former intelligerce officer Milton Shulman 
points out that one of the reasons for German failure in the Ardennes was 
that they ''lacked sufficient fuel • .,90 According to Albert Speer, Germany 
did not have enough fuel to mount such an offensive in the first place.91 
Field Marshal Montgomery claimed that the enemy "had not the resources in 
fuel to implement a plan of this scope. As he reached the limit of pene-
tration, the enemy was forced to abandon nruch equipment through lack of 
petrol and lubricants."92 Winston Churchill believed that "strategic 
89 The .!'.!!!:, Reports, P.• 423 • 
90shulman, Defeat ~ .!Jl2. ~, p. 247. 
9l"u.~. Strategic Bombing Survey Shows How Nazi La.ck of Oil Hastened 
Their Defeat," p. 62. 
92Bernard L.M. Montgomery, Normandz to the Baltic (Boston, 1948), p. 
286. - --
101 
bombing raids on German l"efineries helped to deny him petrol and slacken 
the advanceo"93 And General Quar Bradley9 while paying high tribute to 
the rale of his own .American ground rorces 11 adr·itted that 
ooothe acute fuel shortages that .had followed destruction 
by air of the enemy0 s petroleum industry had forced von 
Rundstedt to mount his attack without adequate gasoline 
reserveso Without ~aptured American fuel his offensive 
could not succeedo9~ 
'lhe historian has time to use the word "if," but in JamiarySI 1945, 
Hitler SI OKW9 and the German comrr.ia.nders did noto '!hey did not have time 
to say: "!! Peiper had had sufficient fuel at StoumontSI" or "!!. the 2nd 
Panzer Division had had enough fuel to cross the Meuseo" For on the 
Eastern Front a far greater storm was gathering., The Red Army was on 
the verge of launching against the German Army its greatest offensive of 
the waro This was to be followed by the drive of the Western Allies deep 
into Germany o Not only did Hi tJ..er0 s ,gamble in the Ardennes fail SI but the 
results of that failure 9 along with the fuel shortage 9 were to bring 
catastrophe to Ger.manyo The better part of Germany0 s resources, in= 
eluding fuel 9 had been scraped up for the Ardennes, and by January9 1945, 
there was little lefto The German collapse on both fronts was now im-
minento 
93Churchill 9 !b!_ Second 1-brld li&.11 VI, po 2760 
94:ar,adleySI ! Soldier0 s story, po 4750 
CHAPTER V 
THE FINAL MONTHS 
Now Germany was to pay the price for this costly gamble in the West. 
The attack in the Ardennes and its consequent failure had deprived the 
German armies on all f ronts of their badly needed fuel reserves.l The 
fuel which had been hoarded for four months was gone, and the crisis was 
compounded by continuing Allied air raids on German oil production. By 
March virtually all production had ceased.2 The Allied air attacks, 
along with a 4,000,000 gallon expenditure in the Ardennes, hastened the 
inevitable, and t he collapse of Germany came quickly in the spring of 
1945. 
If the Wehrmacht had ever needed gasoline , it was in January, 1945 , 
on the Eastern Front. There the German Army's fuel problems were the 
same as those in the Ardennes , only now Germany was on the defensive and 
had much less fuel . Since August, 1944, four great Russian army groups 
had been readying themselves on t he Vistula f or the final l unge to Ber -
lin. During that month t he Red Army had won an important bridgehead at 
Ba.ranov on t he Vistula , south of Warsaw, and hel d it successfully against 
repeated German attacks. On January 12 the Russian~ broke through the 
Germans' Vistula defense l ine and out of the Ba.ranov bridgehead. In less 
1Bi.rkenfeld, ~ synthetische Treibstof f , 1212.-~, p. 207; Von 
Luttichau , "The German Counteroffensive in the Ardennes , 11 p. 459; Pogue , 
~ Supreme Command , p. 418. 
2
~Innis, ~ ~' Sixth ~' P• 87. 
102 
103 
than forty-eight hours the Red Army's tanks were pouring out on the Po-
lish plain toward Silesia and Frankfurt on the Oder. Because of the 
gasoline shortage, the Germans did not have the mobil~ty to contain the 
Russian offensive. After the war, Albert Speer testified that though 
the Germans were able to mass 1,200 tanks in an attempt to stop the 
Russian attack at Ba.ranov, they were of little use. There was only 
enough fuel to fill them two or three times, and after that there ~s no 
gasol,ine left) The armor was destroyed or captured. The Germans found 
it impossible to hold the broken front without sufficient fuel, for by 
late February the Russians had taken Silesia and in early March they were 
on the Oder River. Berlin was now less than fifty miles away. 
At this point the Western Allies resumed the offensive. It had re-
quired almost a month for the British and Americans to regroup and ready 
themselves after the Ardennes attack, but in the second week of February 
they breached the Sie.gfried Line and the way lay open to the Rhine. On 
March 7 the Americans experienced a stroke of amazing luck. On that date 
the U. s. 9th Armored Division captured the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen, 
opening the way for the Allies to cross the Rhine and pour into Germany. 
Now there was no stopping until the El.be River was reached in early 
April. Germany's fuel drought was a direct boon to the Allied advance, 
as the German Army did not have the fuel to sidestep quickly enough to 
contain the Allied offensive. General Bradley summed up the whole situa-
' 
tion most succinctly: 
When the Allied breakthroughs followed west of the Rhine 
in February, across the Rhine in March, and throughout 
Germany in April, lack of gasoline in countless local 
3Testimony of Albert Speer, May 30, 1945, U. s., .Qbh Division, No. 
109, P• 39. 
situations was the direct factor behind the destruction or 
surrender of vast quantities of tanks, guns, trucks, and 
of thousands upon thousands of enemy troops.4 
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In the closing month.s of the war in &trope, not only did the Allied 
air forces deny oil to the German Army, but so did the Allied ground 
forces. In the West the Americans and British found little oil pro-
duction left to capture. A large number of Germany's synthetic oil 
plants were in the Ruhr, but they had already been destroyed from the 
air. '!he same was true with the natural oil refineries in the Hanover 
and Hamburg areas. But in the F.ast it was different. While many of the 
refineries had sustained heavy damage from the air in 1944 and 1945, 
they were still able to produce some fuel. It was easier for American 
and British bombers to reach the Ruhr than it was for them to bomb Ru-
mania, Silesia, Hungary, and Austria. Only by conquest could a complete 
stoppage of production be insured. When the Russians overran the Sile-
sian industrial area in January, 1945, they captured three of Germany's 
new synthetic oil plants.5 By January the Red A:rmy had driven the Ger-
mans from the Lake Balaton oil fields in Hungary. The only important 
German oil fields left for the Allies to capture were those in the Han-
over area, and they had been wrecked from the air. 
Thus, the factor of petroleum and its products was as decisive at 
the conclusion of the war in &trope as it was in the beginning. Indeed, 
to a striking degree, the Second \<brld War in &trope was as much a 
"struggle for oil" as it was a "struggle for &trope." As earl..y as 1935 
there were clear indications that Hitler had designs on the rich oil 
4 U. s., The United States Strategic Bombing Survey, Oil Division, 
Overall Report (Washington, D. c., 1945), p. 44. 
JWilmot, ~ Struggle f2!. llirope, p. 526. 
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fields of the Caucasus96 and his inva3ion of Russia in 1941 cannot be 
explained without l"efel"e~e to Gemany0 s unquenClhable th.i?"st for gaso= 
line(} 7 Nor ~am one underist&nd GEilc'lWln operations in Africa without ap:, 
pI"eciating the Clritieal l"ole of oilo Had Rommel been successful at El 
. . . . ~ 
Al&mein in 19421) his next obj~~tives a.fte:r Suez were to have been the 
Middlo F.astern ©il fields of Iraq and I?ano8 Ccndition$ in Germany in 
1945 ~d have been diffe;roent if the oil of Rnssia and the Middle East 
had been availableo 
Daring the last months of Nazi, Germany0 s erlstenees> Hitler0 s mili= 
' . 
ta.ry policy was largely determin~d by the Wehfflacht0 s :fuel requi~entso 
For examplall the Fnehrel" made frantie efforts to protect the oil fields 
of lfu.ngary and Austria while Ga?Wlny itsw..f' was caving ino Next to Rn= 
maniall Hungal"y ws Gal"ll'l&ny0 s mt»~t imp0>1"t&nt o:ro.de oil soul"Cleo 9 In Jam-
aeyp 1945~ Speer infomed Hitler that the air attacks were continuing 
and the all"eady serlous fuel Cll"isis was mountingo Because the under= 
gl"oo.nd syntheti~. fuel plants we?'~ not matel"ializing as planned 9 Speer 
felt that the Hungal"ian pJ:>Oduetion was now of crucial importanceolO This 
was a main reason for HitleT.0 s despel"a.te defense of Hungary in December 
and Januaey9 and of Aust,l"'ia in Febl"'lllaeyo 
7uo So, .Q!! _Divis:l9E,9 Noa 109!) PPo 36 9 390 See alsc, OKW Dire~tive 
No o 45 ~ signed by ffl. tler 9 July 23 9 19!n 9 Ho Ro Trevoir ... Rope,z, 9 ed a 9 fili tz.,, 
krieg ~ De.feat~ !fitJ._er0 s ~ Dll'ectives 9 ill2,=!945 (New Yorksi 1964)9 Po 
1310 ' 
8oKW I)j.l"~tive Noa 32 11 signed by Wal"lim~ntll Junie 11 11 1941~ Trevor= 
Roper1> §.itzk;f.leg ~ Dsf'eat~ 1!1~~:r0 s ~.!: Q!recij,!ye!9 ~=12!:till Po 800 
9Paul Wohl. 9 ' 9Geman Offensive Aimed at Allied HCill'lle Front9 " &.rl"on° s 9 
XXIV (December 25 9 1944) 9 po 5o 
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In response to this threat Hitler reinforced the Hungarian and Aus-
trian fronts even at the expense of the critical Vistula line in Poland. 
By the middle of January Hitler realized that the Western Front must 
once again go on the defensive and that troops must be moved quickly to 
the East. General Guderian pleaded for the troops in the Ardennes to be 
sent to the Vistula, but instead they were transported to Hungary to 
protect the oil fields.11 Guderian was furious, but Hitler patronizing-
ly explained that ''if you don'.t get any more fuel your tanks won't be 
able to move and the aeroplanes won't be able to fly. You must see that. 
But my generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war. 1112 In 
regard for Hitler's supposed la.ck of concern for the Russian drive 
through Poland, Field Marshal Keitel later testified that the Fuehrer 
would "rather see Berlin fall than lose the Hungarian oil area and 
Austria. nl3 
But Hitler was too late. On April 25, 1945, the advancing American 
forces met their Russian counterparts at Torgau on the El.be River, and 
Germany was cut in half. The end ca.me twelve days later. It is diffi-
cult to point out one specific reason as to why one nation loses a war 
and the other wins. Undoubtedly, Germany did not lose the war in Europe 
solely because of a fuel deficiency. Quite obviously, other factors 
must be considered. But, as this work has attempted to show, all of 
Germany's material and human resources in the fall and winter of the 
last year of the war were of little value without oil. The end would 
have been different if adequate gasoline had been available. 
llWarlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, 1212.-~, P• 499. 
12Quderian, Panzer Leader, p. 393. 
13warlimont, Inside Hitler's Headquarters, .!2a2.-~, p. 499. 
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SYNTHETIC FUEL PRODUCTION PLANTS IN GREATER 
GERMANY 
Hydrogenation: 
Tons* Tons* 
No. Plant per No. Plant per 
Month Month 
1 Launa 50,000 14 Hl.echhammer 13,750 
2 Boehl en 25,000 15 Heydebreck 3,330 
3 Magdeburg 20,000 16 Auschwitz 2,500 
4 Zeitz 25,000 
5 Scholven 20,000 Fischer-Tropsch Synthesis: 
6 Galsenberg 35,000 17 Ruhrchemie 5,000 
7 Welheim 12,500 18 Victor 3,330 
8 Poelitz 50,000 19 Rheinpreussen 5,500 
9 Inetzkendorf 4,000 20 Krupp 5,500 
10 Wesseling 17,000 21 Essener Steinkohle 7,080 
11 Indwigshafen-Oppau 4,000 22 Hoe sch 4,ooo 
12 Moosbierbaum 7,500 23 Schwarzheide 14,170 
13 Bruez 50,000 24 Schaffgotsch 3,333 
2~ Luetzkendorf 11000 
*Installed capacity at end of war 
REFINING CAPACITY IN GREATER GERMANY AND PROTECTORATE 
No. Location Tons per No. Location Tons per 
Month· Month 
OLD GERMANY 47 Leipzig 250 
26 Ha.rburg 60,000 Hamburg 1,250 
27 Gras brook 17,000 Hannover 600 
28 Wilhelms burg 8,350 Bremen 500 
29 Monheim 16,000 48 Mannheim l,2'i0 
30 Wilhelms burg 10,000 VIENNA AREA 
31 Heide 16,000 49 Wlen-Floridsdorf 13,uoo 
32, 33 Mis burg 27 ,000 50 Kagran 9,000 
34 Intzkendorf 10,000 51 Schwechat 15,000 
35 Salz bergen 5,250 52 Vosendorf 7,000 
36 Einmerich 6,000 53 Korneuburg 7,000 
37 Dollbergen 4, 200 54 Moosbierbaum 12,500 
Hannover 1,700 55 Lobau 25,000 
38 Ostermoor 10,000 PROTECTORATE CZEX;H AREA 
39 Hamburg 2,500 56 Press burg 16,700 
4-0 Peine 1,500 57 Oderfurt 6,000 
41 Har burg 45,000 58 Kolin 12,500 
4?. Hamburg 35,000 59 Pardubitz 12,500 
Oppau 1,250 60 Oderberg 1,000 
43 Oslebshausen 10,000 61 Kralupy 1,500 
44 Wedel 2, 500 POLAND-GALICIAN AREA 
45 Pechelbronn 10,000 63 Trzebinia 22,500 
46 Hamburg 5,000 64 Dzieditz 8,500 
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